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Executive summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate what a restructuring of the Québec electricity 
market could mean for Hydro-Québec and the Province of Québec. The thesis is divided into 
four main sections. Section one describes the drivers of electricity markets and we get an 
introduction to the situation in Québec. The environmental aspect of energy is also 
explained. Section two describes the electricity market in Norway and the Nordic countries, 
which works as a benchmark in this thesis. Section three shows how a restructured market in 
Québec could be designed, which impact this would have on electricity prices and hence 
what potential there is for Hydro-Québec. The last section summarizes the thesis, which 
shows that revenues from electricity sales can experience a significant increase if there is 
political will.  
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Statements 
- I have chosen to take the approach of using the plural form we throughout the thesis.  
- All currency values are in Canadian Dollars (CAD), if not otherwise stated.  
- For simplicity is one U.S. Dollar (USD) set to have the same value as one CAD.  
With the basis of the last year’s currency rates, this is a reasonable assumption.  
- One CAD is set to be 6 Norwegian Kroner (NOK). 
- One CAD is set to be 0.75 Euro (EUR). 
- One Euro is set to be 8 NOK. 
- British Thermal Unit (BTU) is a traditional energy unit.  
Often seen as one million BTU (mmBTU).  
- If not otherwise stated is weight measured in metric standards.  
- kWh = 10^3 Watt hours  
- TWh = 10^12 Watt hours 
- Tables and figures are given chronological numbers on a chapter basis. 
- Only headings level one (main sections) and two (sections) are listed in the table of 
content.  
- Text is following English (U.S.) grammar standards, while Norwegian standards are 
used in Excel tables and figures.  
- Internet references are not shown with the date of application in the footnotes. 
Please see reference list. 
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“I shall make electricity so cheap 
that only the rich can afford to burn candles” 
Thomas A. Edison 
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1.0 Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Canada is a country in North-America that consists of ten provinces and three territories. In 
size, Canada is the second largest country in the world with an area of almost 10 million km².  
The country is known for having a rich access to a variety of natural resources. Most of the 
33 million inhabitants of the country live in the provinces, which are bordering the United 
States of America.  Québec is the largest province and French is the official language. French 
settlements have been living in the province for more than 400 years and today 7.7 million 
people live in Québec, which is often considered to be a characteristic province that still is 
highly influenced by the French culture. Political towards the international arena the 
different parts of Canada stand united together. Internally the provinces and territories have 
a strong political and economical independence. As a consequence, electricity markets are 
under provincial control.  
Hydro-Québec generates, transmits and distributes electricity in the province of Québec. 
Almost all of the electricity generated in the province comes from hydro electricity. Hydro-
Québec is owned by the Québec government and has monopoly on the regulated Québec 
electricity market. Electricity has traditionally been, and is still considered to be priced at a 
low level. 165 TWh per year, which is roughly Québec’s yearly need and consumption of 
electricity, are guaranteed supplied at a low price through a law called Act respecting the 
Regie de l’energie. The law is more commonly known as the The Heritage Pool. The price of 
electricity shall according to this law only reflect the average cost of generating, transmitting 
and distributing the electricity plus a reasonable rate of return. This is called the cost-of-
service basis. This measure gives Québec some of the lowest electricity prices in North-
America.  
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1.2 Motivation of the thesis 
The last two decades we have seen electricity markets all over the world being deregulated 
and restructured. In Canada the provinces of Alberta and Ontario have restructured their 
electricity market. The province of Québec still has a regulated electricity market under 
governmental control. A restructuring of the Québec electricity market is a hot topic in 
Québec today and the intensity of this discussion is expected to grow in the future.  
We start this thesis by looking into factors that determines supply and demand in electricity 
markets. Knowledge about the market is essential when we investigate how the inhabitants 
of Québec would react to a restructured electricity market where the market sets the 
electricity price.  Several factors influence the supply and demand of electricity and a general 
presentation of these variables will help us understand the demand situation in Québec. We 
will look into how a markets with or without market power handles the supply of electricity. 
Natural resources are key determinants when deciding at which cost electricity can be 
supplied. Together with governmental guidance it determines most of the supply conditions.  
With this as background knowledge, we will examine the motivation behind changing the 
Heritage Pool policy that restricts Hydro-Québec as an energy supplier. 
In the light of climate change, which is a great problem of discussion in the 21st century, we 
find it natural to see how generators of hydroelectricity can take advantage of the 
greenhouse gas emission regulations. We give an introduction to the reasons behind the 
climate change, so we understand why emission reductions must be targeted. One way to 
reduce greenhouse emissions is to make the polluter pay. This might sound as an easy 
incentive form, but in reality it is a very hard task to allocate the costs of a global problem. 
We will see how policies today handle these issues. The climate change section is naturally 
followed up by a theoretical presentation of economic theory models relevant for taxation 
and cap & trade.  
The nature of the electricity markets in Québec and Norway makes these two markets very 
interesting to compare. These two electricity markets have disposal of the same natural 
resource able to create electricity. 99 percent of the electricity being generated in Norway is 
produced from hydroelectric power plants, while the province of Québec generates 96 
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percent1 of their energy from hydropower. On a world basis only about 16 percent are 
produced from hydroelectric power plants2.  Norway chose to restructure its electricity 
market 20 years ago and therefore represent an opposite market design than the one in 
Québec. Having these two markets with similar resources, but different market design, is 
valuable for this thesis. We initially believe the Nordic electricity market with Norway as a 
key role player can be a very good benchmark for Québec.  
The purpose of this thesis is to use the theoretical background and knowledge of other 
electricity markets, to develop a new market design for the Québec and see how profitable it 
could be for Hydro-Québec. We start this thesis supposing that the Québec electricity 
market has a great restructuring potential. We initially suppose that Hydro-Québec and the 
province of Québec miss out on large revenues from domestic sales, export and efficiency 
losses by regulating the industry the way it is done today. A goal of a restructured electricity 
market is to make the consumers in Québec more energy efficient and hence make more 
electricity available for exports. We will try to see how environmental taxes and quotas can 
affect the price of electricity and see if this has a revenue potential for Québec as a producer 
of hydroelectricity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Statistics Canada, Electric Power Statistics Jan 03, 2003 
2
 IEA, Electricity/Heat in the World in 2007 
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1.3 Background electricity  
Electricity is a source of energy and a key ingredient in the world as we know it. Today’s 
society is dependent on electricity to cover daily needs as heating and making food. For the 
world to continue the technical and economical growth experienced the last centuries, 
availability of electricity supply is essential. We can define electricity as a bundled 
commodity of energy and transportation. This commodity has some specific characters that 
make the industry particular. Electricity cannot be stored and it therefore needs to be 
consumed at the same time as being produced. The demand varies great from time a day, 
week, and year. One unit of electricity is measured in watts, but it is not possible to 
physically trace this unit back to the producer or give the unit different attributes. That 
makes electricity a homogenous product.  
The net electrical output from an electric generator at a given time is measured in 
Megawatts (MW) and is referred to as power. Consumption of electricity is measured in 
Watt hours and is most commonly seen as kilowatt hour (kWh) which describes the amount 
of energy consumed. KWh is used as a billing unit that quantifies energy deliveries from 
generators to end consumers. 
 
Figure 1.1 Market chain 
Figure 1.1 shows how the electricity market is shaped in its simplest form. Electricity is 
generated through several kinds of production technologies. These technologies have very 
different characteristics when it comes to flexibility, production costs and emission of 
greenhouse gases. From the production site, the electricity is transported through a 
transmission grid to the customers. To make the electricity usable for consumption, the 
electricity is transformed in the distribution network before being delivered. These basic 
features and economic characteristics of the industry make the design foundation of the 
electricity market, and is useful background knowledge for the further work of this thesis.  
 
Generation Transmission Distribution Consumption
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1.4 Supply and demand in electricity markets  
1.4.1 Elasticity basics 
Above we defined electricity as a commodity which demand varies great in due to day, week 
and year. In this section we will look into factors that affect demand and supply, and hence 
price of electricity. To be able to separate and analyze electricity consumption, customers 
are often divided into classification groups. A useful and broadly used approach is to divide 
customers into sectors as household, service/commercial industry and heavy/energy 
intensive industry. Sectors are useful when we try to determine elasticities for different 
customer groups.    
Elasticities measure the percentage change in one variable as a consequence of a one 
percent change in another variable. An analysis of elasticities is a sensitivity analysis. 
Elasticities are often used when we discuss changes in prices. We are interested in finding 
out how much a one percent increase in price will influence the quantity demanded and 
hence if the price change is profitable.  
             
As an example, a store sells 1000 lawn mowers each year. If the price next year rises with 
one percent from 500 dollars to 505 dollars and price elasticity is -1.5, the store will next 
year sell 985 units. Total revenues will decrease from 500,000 to 497,425. Revenues 
decrease because the reduction in demand is larger relative to the price increase. We say 
that demand is elastic since it is greater than 1. An explanation can be that other stores in 
the area have kept last year’s price. When there are no close substitutes, we can experience 
another outcome with an inelastic demand, where elasticity is less than 1.  
Other elasticities we often observe are income elasticity and cross-price elasticity between 
different goods. Elasticities also occur for the supply side, where the supply is influenced by 
factors as raw material input prices, wages, taxes and interest rates. Elasticities are often 
calculated for a certain point on the demand or supply curve. This has its limitations as 
elasticities tend to change, dependent of the position on the curves. Alternatively arc 
elasticities are used, where elasticities are measured over a certain range of prices.   
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Following we will try to explain the drivers in electricity markets by using examples and data 
relevant for Québec. We believe such an approach with including Québec data and relevant 
examples in the theoretical presentation, gives a greater understanding of both the theory 
and the underlying situation of the Québec electricity market. 
1.4.2 Income elasticity 3 
The general economical activity level (GDP) of a country seems to be a major demand driver 
of electricity.  
  
Figure 1.2 4 Income elasticity 
The figure above is almost similar to a figure in Wangensteens book Power System 
Economics – the Nordic Electricity Market. The figure shows the correlation between 
electricity, real GDP which represents income and the total energy use in the Unites States. 
U.S. data gives us an estimate for the situation in Québec and Canada, and the U.S. 
electricity market will play an important role later in this paper. Unlike Wangensteens chart 
of 12 traditional EU states, the real GDF grows more than the electricity use. Income 
elasticity for electricity in the USA is therefore under 1 according to this chart. A possible 
explanation is that USA is in a post industrial stage and that electricity consumption is less 
responsive to changes in income. We see that business cycles affects energy and electricity 
use as well. The downturn in the economy around year 2000, lead to a smaller demand of 
                                                          
3
 Section 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 are based on Wangensteen, Power System Economics – the Nordic Electricity Market, 
CH 3, 2007 
4
 Democratic Policy Committee, The Case for a 21
st
 Century Electricity Transmission System  
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total energy and electricity. In this U.S. example, higher oil prices lead to higher prices of 
both electricity and other energy products. We will get back to how prices of energy 
products correlate. The most important we can learn from figure 1.2 is that economic 
conditions play a role in determining the demand for electricity.  
1.4.3 Price elasticity 
A demand driver with high relevancy in this thesis is price elasticity. A possible restructuring 
of the Québec electricity market would have a direct impact on the prices, and is therefore a 
factor we must examine. As most other commodities, electric consumption is dependent on 
price. But consumers are also highly dependent on electricity. We can therefore state that 
the elasticity of demand for electricity is inelastic in the short run. For many purposes is it 
hard to substitute electricity as a source of energy. The only way to avoid higher electricity 
bills in the short run is to reduce consumption. In the longer run consumers are more 
adaptable and able to substitute their energy needs to other energy sources or lower their 
consumption with permanent solutions as for example better housing isolation.  
The consumption and elasticity of electricity is comparable to those which implies for 
gasoline. It takes time for people to change their consumption pattern considerably. If the 
price suddenly rises sharply for gasoline, it will in the short term induce less immediate 
consumption. People will reduce their driving. But this is possible to reduce only by a certain 
amount. In the long run consumers will change the type of cars, to smaller and more fuel 
efficient vehicles. We have seen evidence of this during the last ten years. The car park has 
changed radically due to higher fuel prices and more focus on environmental friendliness.  
The same is reasonable to assume for electricity. If the price goes up considerably, the price 
sensitive consumers will consume less. But it is hard to go through with other measures in 
the short run. In the longer run, the consumer will be more price elastic. Measures as more 
energy efficient buildings and usage of other sources of energy take time to implement. 
These measures must also be proven to be economical efficient. A consumer therefore 
needs to analyze the market for some time to make sure the actions taken are profitable.  
It is behind of the scope of this thesis to make an analyze of different elasticities in the 
Québec electricity market. Such analyzes would demand great insight into statistical 
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methods, and time and efforts had to be placed in a large survey. We therefore take 
advantage of previous analyzes made by researchers within the field. What is both 
fascinating and confusing, is that these results tend to differ quite much. This can be 
expected, because when deciding price elasticities you must exclude all other factors. The 
regulated price experienced in Québec, also makes it hard to perform a real life research 
based on dynamic prices.  
Wangensteen presents us the following results from Canadian studies of price elasticity on 
electricity.  
Study Sector Price elasticity 
Short term Long term 
National Energy 
Board Canada 
1989 
Household -0.16 -0.73 
Service -0.13 -0.46 
Industry -0.11 -0.45 
Energy, Mines & 
Resources 
Canada 1990 
Household -0.14 -1.10 
Service -0.06 -0.36 
Industry -0.09 -0.49 
 
Table 1.1 Price elasticity I 
This study clearly highlights the fact that demand is more elastic in the long run that the 
short run. We recognize that households seem to be more price sensitive than service and 
industries. Disadvantages with these studies are that they are twenty years old and based on 
data from all over Canada.  
Arsenault et al. have made a research on the Québec demand for energy. This study 
investigates total energy demand and focuses not only on electricity. Unfortunately, it exist 
very few studies made on pure electricity demand in Québec, so we choose to include this 
study due to the fact that electricity stands for about half of the final energy use in Québec 
and it can give us a relevant comparison.  The study by Arsenault et al. compares its own 
results with three other studies. We will present two of them, as the third one is not directly 
comparable due to statistical specifications. 
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Study Sector Price elasticity 
Short term Long term 
Arsenault and 
others 
Household -0.28 -0.68 
Service -0.33 -0.59 
Industry -0.16 -0.35 
IFSDM Household -0.12 -0.40 
Service -0.42 -1.06 
Industry -0.15 -0.48 
CANREM Household -0.12 -0.49 
Service -0.28 -0.62 
Industry -0.07 -0.21 
 
Table 1.2 5 Price elasticity II 
Longva, Olsen and Strøm performed a similar research in Norway 1988 right before the 
deregulation found place. The motivation is to show the connection between economic 
growth and the energy sector and they therefore examined long term electricity price 
elasticities.   
Sector Primary 
industries 
Energy 
intensive 
industries 
Other 
manufacturing 
industries 
Service 
industries 
Households Total 
economy 
Price 
elasticities 
 
-0.40 
 
-0.70 
 
-0.60 
 
-0.69 
 
-0.53 
 
-0.55 
 
Table 1.3 6 Price elasticity III 
Based on the results of these studies we can support out initial thoughts that the demand 
for electricity is inelastic. A one percent rise in the price of electricity will reduce 
consumption by less than one percent. Different sectors seem to have different levels of 
                                                          
5
 Arsenault et al., A total energy demand modell for Québec, 2005 
6
 Longva, Olsen and Strøm, Total elasticities of energy demand, 1988 
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elasticity and all sectors have inelastic demand. Subsidizing or regulating electricity prices to 
an artificial low level therefore seems to be economically inefficient. 
1.4.4 Weather conditions 
A very important factor influencing the demand for electricity is weather conditions with 
temperature and precipitation as the most important variables. The temperature affects the 
demand for electricity in two ways. In areas with cold winter conditions we recognize a large 
demand during winter. We say that we have a peak demand during winter. These conditions 
apply for both Norway and Canada. Another peak demand period can be observed during 
summer, in areas where it gets warmer than the comfort temperature. Electricity is needed 
to run air condition units. Certain areas in both USA and Canada can experience such peaks 
during summer due to warm temperatures. Temperatures are most relevant for households 
and commercial/service industry. Electricity demand varies great for the time of the day. For 
households there are two peak periods, one in the morning when people wake up and start 
their day, and one in the evening when they get back from work and perform daily activities 
as cooking and showering.  The tertiary sector of the industry fills up the demand between 
the two household peaks, demand is greatest during normal work hours. For energy 
intensive industries it is more difficult to exemplify. Energy use can vary from a constant 
need through 24 hour a day, 7 days a week, to peaks during nights if production is located in 
an area or country where electricity is cheaper during low demand hours. Where hydro 
power counts for a large share of the total production, the precipitation has a great 
influence on the price. Capacities from thermal plants are constant. If we experience a year 
with low precipitation, it means that more expensive production methods must be used. 
With an oversupply of water, turbines at hydro plants run constantly and we may experience 
a water overflow. Prices will then be lower. In figure 1.4 this can be explained by adjusting 
the horizontal arrow representing hydro power available.  
1.4.5 Volatility of the US currency 
Raw materials are priced in US dollars. For countries that import raw materials for use in 
electricity generation, a weak dollar is an advantage as the input factor is cheaper. In for 
example Europe, this can lead to better conditions for German coal plants which again lead 
to lower prices. For Québec and Canada as a electricity exporter to USA., a weaker dollar 
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means that the U.S. have less purchasing power and that the exporter needs to reduce its 
prices to not be out shifted by cheaper U.S. power suppliers. During the last five years from 
January 2005 we have experienced large fluctuations in the exchange rate, with a USD/CAN 
minimum of 0.90 compared to a maximum of 1.30.  A strong Canadian Dollar against the 
USD is not an advantage for exports to the south and the variation can lead to differences in 
electricity demand from the U.S.  
1.4.6 Fossil fuel prices 
As for other commodities, the prices of fossil fuels are determined from supply and demand 
and vary on the basis of many factors. The prices are closely connected to the world 
economy. Political situations can strongly influence the price levels.  Political instability in the 
Middle East has shown us the last century how the oil price can be affected. Last subsection 
showed how raw material prices are influenced by USD changes.  Oil itself is not the most 
important price indicator for electricity, but tends to correlate with prices of coal and natural 
gas. Much more electricity is generated from coal and gas. The two main price determinants 
are the marginal cost of the coal or gas and transportation costs. Coal is mainly transported 
by ships or railways, while gas is transported in either pipelines or special liquid natural gas 
(LNG) ships. Freight rates in shipping can vary much and can affect the price levels. 
Forecasting future freight rates is an art of its own. Most natural gas imports to the U.S. 
come from Canada by pipeline, and coal mostly comes from Colombia, which represents a 
short haul route with less price variation. Shipping rates are therefore not a larger topic in 
this thesis. 
Gas is a more expensive electricity generation method than coal, but has several advantages 
compared to coal based generation. A main advantage is that it is considered to be a much 
cleaner form of energy, with lower emissions. In areas that are rich of one of the resources, 
transportation costs will naturally also be lower. Long term contracts of supply are more to 
be found in the natural gas market than for oil and coal.  High infrastructure investments for 
pipelines makes suppliers secure a certain price level for the gas delivered. Price contracts 
have therefore often been tied to the developments of the oil price. Recently spot markets 
for natural gas are developing, and the natural gas price is expected to be more 
independent. The New York Mercantile Exchange is the world’s leading commodity exchange 
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and the Henry Hub represents the pricing point for spot and future prices of natural gas 
deliveries. The following figure shows the development of the natural gas delivered for 
electric generation in the U.S.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 7 Natural gas prices for electric generation 
The relative large price changes tell us that in the U.S. the price is quite independent and 
varies by supply and demand factors. This is a very interesting finding when we later are 
about to see that natural gas is the price setter in the north eastern parts of the USA. 
1.4.7 Cross-price elasticities 
A 1989 study from Hydro-Québec shows that 80 percent of the households in Québec use 
electricity as their unique source of energy8. This number has been increasing since then and 
today electricity dominates the market. The residential demand in Québec is therefore less 
influenced by price changes of other energy sources than areas with multiple sources of 
energy available. Over 10,000 households convert from oil to electric heating in Québec 
every year9. For larger customers it is natural to believe that more choices of energy sources 
are possible. The price of other energy sources should therefore still be considered as a 
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current factor. Unfortunately, there is little research done on cross price elacticities within 
Québec. An old study of residential energy demand from 1987, gives an insight to some of 
the research that has been done.  
 Electricity Oil Gas 
Price electricity -0.59 0.35 -0.27 
Price oil 0.37 -0.76 0.05 
Price gas -0.03 0.01 -1.39 
Table 1.4 
10
 Cross-price elasticity 
These results show the own and cross price elasticities of electricity, oil and gas with 
constant income for the Québec residential demand. Unfortunately the cross price 
elasticities are quite different from other studies11. This makes it hard to determine 
something concrete. We especially question the numbers between electricity and gas. They 
are both negative and is a result contrary to expectation. Bernard thinks that gas and 
electricity moves closely, and says that not much weight should be given the data above12. 
Residential consumers have not often the possibility to change between energy sources. To 
install a natural gas driven generator for an individual residential demand requires 
investments costs. Especially in Québec where it has been very cheap to install and use 
electric ovens, it is reasonable to expect low cross elasticities numbers. For large electricity 
users, we could expect more willingness to substitute between energy sources in the long 
run.  Considering electric generation, we would expect that the lowest cost generating 
method would always be preferred. In reality, this is not the case, because many more 
aspects play a role. The environmental aspect is one of them. We will see this later in this 
thesis.  
1.4.8 Developments in an open market 
In an open market with no market power, a producer will operate as a price taker in the 
market. An open market assumes product homogeneity, free entry and exit barriers, 
transparency and full information. There are no governmental regulations or subsidies. The 
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21 
 
supply conditions in such an area depend largely on the production technologies available to 
produce electricity. A coal plant using a coal fired steam turbine has quite different cost 
characteristics than a hydroelectric producer or a windmill farm. The cost structure differs 
much with respect to fixed costs, variable costs, unit commitments requirements and 
ramping, start and stopping costs13. The supply curve with different production technologies 
is often referred to as merit order loading or industry cost curve.  The producers with the 
lowest marginal cost per unit will get to sell their products first until their capacity is used. 
The numbers of suppliers continues to grow up the ladder until the industry cost curve hits 
the demand, as a profit maximizing company will continue producing until price reaches 
marginal cost of that additional unit. This can be showed in the following figure of the most 
common technologies and their short run marginal cost curve. 
 
Figure 1.4 Merit order curve 
We will recognize this curve in markets where capacity already is available. The market price 
is decided by demand and the least cost efficient supplier. We then understand that in an 
open market with different production technologies, marginal production cost has a large 
influence on the supply curve. Since demand varies throughout the day, more expensive 
production methods must produce electricity in peak hours. This can typically lead to higher 
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prices during the day and cheap prices during night. Since the start and stop up costs in 
thermal production are considerable, it may be better to let the plants run during nighttime 
and let consumers buy electricity cheap. We have this situation in for example Germany, 
which is largely dependent on thermal power production.  
We distinguish between two types of hydro plants, run-of-river power plants and reservoir 
dams. The first type must use the resource when it is available, but the latter can decide 
whether to let the water be stored or to make electricity.  Unlike fossil fuel technologies, fuel 
does not make up the operational or variable cost for a hydropower. Since the marginal cost 
of producing one more kWh is almost zero for hydropower, the operational cost consists of 
the alternative value of the water if the plant has storage capacity. This is often referred to 
as water value or marginal opportunity cost and represents the foregone income of 
production in a later period. This value depends on the marginal cost of the alternative 
production technology, inflow of water, transmission capacity and demand in future periods. 
In periods with too high water inflow, water must be spilled and the marginal opportunity 
cost is low.  On the other side, a scarcity will arise if there is little water in the reservoirs and 
marginal opportunity cost will therefore be higher. Hydropower can therefore at certain 
times be located at a higher or lower marginal cost than in figure 1.4. But on average 
hydropower reveals great opportunities for profits in markets where the marginal cost of the 
most expensive production method sets the price, especially if those production methods 
imply start up and ramping costs. To start and stop a hydro power plant is a simple and fast 
process with very low costs. These peculiar characteristics give producers of hydro power an 
exclusive opportunity to produce electricity during peak hours to a high price, and let other 
production methods cover the base load demand to lower prices.  
In the long run the market price must cover new investments in production capacity. The 
LRMC supply curve will therefore look different than the one in figure 1.4. For hydropower 
producers the largest costs are the fixed cost is the capital cost of investment in plant, 
property and equipment (PPE). The easiest accessible hydropower sites were built first and 
new sites are more expensive to build. Other renewable energy sources are also expensive 
to built, but can be cheap in use as seen with wind.  This explains why natural gas and coal 
plant are that popular to build and holds a great share of the current production capacity, as 
the investments costs are lower. We will discuss financing renewable energy more in section 
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3.7, but the main focus in this thesis will be the fact that Hydro-Quebec’s current capacity is 
already present and that they are able to produce electricity at a lower cost than generators 
of electricity based on fossil fuel sources as showed in figure 1.4. 
1.4.9 Market Power 
In reality we seldom have perfect markets where every participant is a price taker and price 
equals marginal cost.  The electricity market is no exception and varying levels of market 
power can be expected depending on the market conditions. This market power can either 
be created by law or under the fact the leading market participants have been able to 
become too big within its area. Traditionally the electricity markets have been a regulated 
industry, and hence the governments have had control of the tariffs. In deregulated or 
restructured markets capacity limits of the transmission grid leads to the opportunity for a 
company to gain market power. Market power can lead to an oligopoly or monopoly 
situation. The price of electricity can therefore differ quite much from a theoretical open 
market price. It could therefore be interesting to examine how the electricity market in 
Québec would respond under price or quantity competition. This thesis will have the 
approach that a restructured market will try to achieve a perfect market without market 
power. This is a very rough assumption, but it is an approach which is taken for many 
theoretical presentations of a variety of industries. Considering that the Nordic market is 
chasing a closer integration with the European continent to enhance competition and 
develop the market, we believe this is a reasonable approach to make for a restructured 
electricity market.  
The next section describes the Québec electricity market, which experiences market power 
in terms of a governmental regulated market. But unlike monopolistic or oligopolistic theory, 
they do not choose to price where marginal revenue equals marginal costs. The electricity in 
Québec is offered at very low rates, under what in a theoretical situation would have been 
the market equilibrium.  
1.5 The Québec market 
In the early days of the electricity supplies in Québec it was left to private actors. 
Dissatisfaction with high prices and poor management led to an expropriation of the 
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company holding an almost monopoly position, the Montreal Light, Heat and Power 
Company. It was turned into a crown corporation in 1944, which created the basis of the 
Hydro-Québec we know today.  Led by the liberal government elected in 1960, the whole 
electricity industry in the province was nationalized in 1963 and Hydro-Québec got the sole 
right to acquire the rest of the market. The electricity industry was now a monopoly under 
governmental control. Its mission was to trigger the industrial development and ensure 
uniform and fair rates to all residential customers.  
The next decades increasing energy needs led to a large building activity. The La Grande 
installations, which are among the worlds largest, were planned and built in this period. The 
regulatory framework had a small change in 1981, where Hydro-Québec became a joint-
stock business with the government of Québec as the only owner. In the 1990’s electricity 
markets around the world experienced changes, and Hydro-Québec’s response to the 
changing business environment, was in 1997 to create an agency named Regie de l’energie 
that is responsible for electricity transmission and distribution. The main motivation for this 
small restructuring was to get access to the opened wholesale electricity markets in the USA, 
where Hydro-Québec from now on could sell excess capacity at market prices. The process 
led to a divesture of Hydro-Québec into the Hydro-Québec we know today, with different 
departments that have separate business responsibilities.  
- Hydro-Québec Production 
- Generates power for the Québec market. Supplies Hydro-Québec Distribution with 
165 TWh/year through the Heritage Pool and sell the surplus on wholesale markets. 
The department has the responsibility to balance electricity capacity in the 
transmission grid and is also active in arbitraging and purchase/sale transactions. 
- Hydro-Québec TransEnergie 
Operator of the transmission grid in the province of Québec and responsible for 
interconnections with U.S. Northeast, Ontario and the Canadian Atlantic provinces.  
- Hydro-Québec Distribution 
Monopoly supplier of electricity in Québec. Receives 165 TWh per year from Hydro-
Québec Generation and purchases the rest on tendering markets.  
- Hydro-Québec Equipment 
Designs, builds and maintains generation and transmission facilities. 
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The province of Québec has access to rich hydropower resources that have been explored 
during the last century. This asset makes the Québec supply situation special, where 96 
percent of the energy comes from hydroelectric sources. The basis of the Québec electricity 
market is that Hydro-Québec Production must provide Hydro-Québec Distribution with 165 
TWh per year at the low rate of 2.79 cent per hour. This is determined in the law called Act 
respecting the Regie de l’energie known as The Heritage Pool. The market is under 
governmental control where Regie de l’energie has the role as a monopolistic energy board. 
The board’s mission is to satisfy the energy needs of Québec through sustainable 
development both economically, socially and environmentally. Under the act mentioned, 
Regie has exclusive jurisdiction to set rates in Québec. The Heritage Pool rate is set to cover 
the average costs of production plus a reasonable rate of return. For electricity demand 
above 165 TWh per year, Hydro-Québec Distribution buys capacity by a tender call process. 
This means that small individual providers bid for the contracts. Typical suppliers would be 
investors of a windmill farm or a solar energy installation. Prices paid by Hydro-Québec 
Distribution are often higher than the price it sells the electricity for. Price paid per kWh can 
be around 10 cents per kWh for wind energy and even higher for solar energy due to the 
high investment costs the new capacity requires. So far the tender calls cover a small 
amount of the total capacity, but the cost must be carried by Hydro-Québec and reduces the 
company’s profit.  
1.5.1 The retail market 
When Hydro-Québec is setting prices to their end customers, the same rate setting policy as 
the Heritage Pool applies. Rates to end-customers are supposed to be fair and only cover the 
additional average costs in transmission and distribution plus a reasonable rate of return for 
these divisions. Unlike the Heritage Pool price, the rates are examined every year and 
adjusted if the forecasted additional revenue does not cover the forecasted costs of 
supplying electricity and satisfying the customers demand. Therefore we can claim that the 
customers actually pay for the expensive tender call supplies mentioned in the very end of 
the last subsection. In table 1.5 the most common rates for energy in Québec are be 
presented. Additional power charges will apply for capacity access, and increase the total 
electricity bill.   
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Energy sectors Energy conditions 
Households and farms First 30 kwH/day Remainder of consumption 
Rate D 5.45 ¢/kWh 7.51 ¢/kwh 
Small commercial First 15,090 kWh/year Remainder of consumption 
Rate G 8.82 ¢/kWh 4.85 ¢/kWh 
Medium commercial First 210,000 kWh/year Remainder of consumption 
Rate M 4.51 ¢/kWh 3.19 ¢/kWh 
Large commercial Flat rate Special long-term conditions 
Rate L 2.99 ¢/kWh appears in some industries 
 
Table 1.5 14 Retail prices 
Average annual consumption for individual households and farms is about 17,000 kWh per 
year. This gives an average price of approximately 6.2 cents/kWh. The rates in Québec are 
among the lowest in North America. Every year Hydro-Québec carry out a survey, that 
compares electricity prices in major North American cities for seven customer groups. 
Montreal, which is the biggest city in the province, is the city where rates to residential 
customers are the lowest in the whole survey15. Among all other customer groups is 
Montreal always among the lowest-rate cities. If we compare with cities around Montreal 
located in the north-east of the continent, Québec’s position as low cost electricity supplier 
sticks out even more. Only in the category medium-power customers is Québec then 
marginally beaten.  In general, low prices can be found in areas with rich access to natural 
resources.  
1.5.2 Motivation for restructuring 
The supply situation in Québec creates a remarkable situation where Hydro-Québec as an 
energy producer is quite limited in its choices in regards of production planning and market 
influence. The situation can be shown in the following simplified figure. Please notice that 
scales and measures are not fully applicable, and only meant for an illustration purpose. 
                                                          
14
 Hydro-Québec, Rates and Bills  
15
 Hydro-Québec, Comparison of Electricity Prices in Major North American Cities, 2009 
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Figure 1.5 Market situation 
As we see from this figure, the governmental regulations on supply restrict Hydro-Québec to 
sell electricity at market price. For a large part of its total capacity, Hydro-Québec must sell 
the electricity for less than the market price. We know from microeconomics that such 
restrictions or subventions would create welfare losses. The blue area describes the profit 
Hydro-Québec earns from export sales today. The pink area represents profit from domestic 
sales under the heritage pool. The green area shows producer surplus given to consumers 
due to the Heritage Pool requirements. If a market price was applied, this would lie above 
the 2.79 cent per kWh and Hydro-Québec and its owners, the provincial government, would 
keep of the surplus. The new producer surplus could be used of many public purposes and 
benefitted the population of Québec, instead of being given as subsidized electricity. This is 
one motivation to see why Québec should restructure its electricity market.  
The yellow area represents the power Hydro-Québec must sell as a part of the 165 TWh 
Heritage Pool, where marginal opportunity cost of the energy is above the set price of 2.79 
cent. Even though the marginal cost of production is very low, it is correct to assume that 
marginal opportunity cost at some point exceeds 2.79 cent. This was explained earlier on, 
where the term “water value” also was presented. The Heritage Pool therefore creates a 
welfare loss that would not be present if the market let supply and demand decide the price 
of electricity. A market price for electricity would imply an efficiency improvement in 
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consumption, which could be exported. Export sales are very important for the company’s 
income and profit. This is the second motivation to see how Québec can restructure its 
electricity marked, and will follow us further in this thesis.  
A third motivation is the environmental issues the world is facing today. Hydro-Québec as a 
producer of CO2 free electricity, can gain from environmental policies. This is closely 
connected to the two previous motivation factors, surplus allocation and energy efficiency 
since a price on greenhouse gas emissions possible would affect the electricity price.  In the 
next section we will give an overview of the climate change, before we in later sections will 
try to figure out how this can turn into a business opportunity for Hydro-Québec. 
1.6 Climate change 
1.6.1 Historic changes in the climate on earth 
Changes in our global climate are something that is a part of the natural cycles of the earth. 
Researchers claim that the earth experienced its last ice age about 9000 years ago. The 
temperatures also vary between ice ages. We are now in a period where we have 
experienced the temperatures to be rising the last 300-400 years, from what we call the little 
ice age around year 1600. But since the industrial revolution, us as humans have made an 
impact on the environment never seen before. Our intelligence has made us able to create a 
society where we explore the resources of our planet. This has lead to record high emissions 
of climate gases and affection on the average temperature. The final consequences are yet 
undetermined, but in general researchers have the opinion that the temperatures on earth 
will continue to rise due to the human activity. 
1.6.2 Reasons for the recent climate change 
We often hear about the greenhouse effect and tend to automatically think of it as 
something negative. That the greenhouse effect is actually crucial for our existence is a fact 
we seldom consider. It is estimated that temperatures on earth would have been around 30 
Celsius lower without the greenhouse effect16. But due to our activity, the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has increased significantly the last 200 years. CO2 
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carbon dioxide, CH4 methane and N2O Nitrous oxide are the three largest contributors to 
emissions.  
 
Figure 1.6 17 Total emissions 
The figure above presents the annual greenhouse gas emissions by sector. The electricity 
and heat sector has a great impact on the environment and is the sector that contributes the 
most to CO2 emissions. 41 percent of the total CO2 emissions are directly related to 
electricity and heat, while the total energy sector directly and indirectly actually must 
answer for 94 percent of the total CO2 emissions. For all greenhouse gas emissions, energy 
counts for 83 percent of the emissions. The two generating methods that pollute the most 
are electricity production from coal and natural gas plants. Plants efficiency level can vary 
significantly between countries and plants.  
1.6.3 Consequences of climate change 
As a result of the human imposed emissions argued for above, both temperatures and CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere have increased the last 200 years. The following image 
shows this recent development.  
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Figure 1.7 18 Temperatures and CO2 
The CO2 concentration in the atmosphere has rose by 36% within this time frame and is 
expected to double in about 50 years time if business as usual continues19. If we convert the 
temperature changes into Celsius, we see that the last decade has deviated from the global 
average temperature by about 0.55°C. This might not seem much, but 2°C more than the 
pre-industrial revolution level is believed to change the environment considerable. There is a 
great discussion of how much the temperature will rise the next 100 years, but researchers 
usually end up in an interval between 1°C and 6°C20. Uncertainty characterizes much of the 
climate discussion, as the situation today is never experienced before. Most researchers 
today recognize that the recent development has happened as a consequence from human 
activity, but to estimate the direct impact it will have on the future is extremely difficult as 
we are uncertain of the exact effects of the higher emissions. We also don’t know level of 
emissions we will discharge in the future, but there is now an international understanding 
that emissions need to be reduced to avoid undesired consequences.  
1.6.4 Climate change in Québec 
Québec is the province in Canada that has increased their greenhouse gases the least 
between 1990 and today. Emissions are about four percent higher, which is considered to be 
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quite good due to the population and GDP growth experienced the last 20 years. 
Transportation and the tertiary sector including commercial businesses counts for much of 
the increase. Last November, the provincial government announced that Québec would 
reduce its emissions with 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. Québec’s plans for emission 
reductions are mostly regarding the transportation sector, by promoting public 
transportation and electric vehicles. Unlike other Canadian provinces and U.S. states, the 
electricity generation sector is almost free of greenhouse gas emissions and is therefore not 
directly affected by CO2 reduction plans.  The province’s only major gas power plant was 
closed in 2008 due to dissatisfaction of the emissions from the plant.  
1.6.5 What is done to fight climate change? 
The climate change problem developed into a really hot topic during the 1980’s. In 1992 the 
Earth Summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro agreed on the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, a deal which sets focus on stabilizing the greenhouse gas 
concentration in our atmosphere. The convention was non-binding and provided no 
mandatory limits of maximum emission levels.  It recognized that the industrialized countries 
stand for most of the emissions, and that these countries need to reduce their emissions. 
Developing countries on the other hand, which are in a position to be negatively influenced 
the most by climate change, must be allowed to increase their emissions to be able to 
experience economical and social development. The work following the treaty from 1992, 
lead to the Kyoto Protocol which was established in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. 
1.6.6 The Kyoto Protocol 21 
The Kyoto Protocol filled in the missing gaps of the 1992 Climate Convention and was meant 
to be in force from 2008 to 2012. Individual emission targets were set to each country, 
averaging a 5.2 percent reduction in the emissions from industrialized countries by the end 
of the period. Europe was supposed to reduce its emissions by 8 percent. The base year was 
set to be 1990. The protocol was not valid until enough countries making up 55 percent of 
the worlds greenhouse gas emissions accepted and signed the deal. When major emitters as 
Canada and Russia finally recognized the protocol, it became valid in 2004. The Kyoto 
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Protocol suggests three different flexible mechanisms for countries to control their 
greenhouse gas emissions. The mechanisms are tools to help a country to reduce their 
emissions at ease.  
Before using any flexible mechanisms, the first choice a country has is to reduce their 
emissions domestically by introducing restrictions. It can be very hard to know the marginal 
production and abatement cost for a single emitter, and it can even be economically 
inefficient to make the reductions domestically. The three mechanisms suggested by the 
Kyoto Protocol are therefore meant to help the government to reach their emission goals, so 
that reductions will be accomplished in an efficient way. 
The first flexible mechanism is called Joint Implementation. This mechanism allows a country 
to reduce their own emission by investing in projects in other countries which needs to 
reduce their emissions. The host country will benefit from foreign investments and 
technology.  
The second option is the Clean Development Mechanism. This method has been nicknamed 
the green mechanism, as it allows industrialized countries to invest in emission reducing 
technologies in developing countries without any reducing obligations. This also leads to a 
sustainable development by transferring capital and technology to the developed countries 
and was a necessarily premise for the developing countries to accept the Kyoto Protocol.  
The last mechanism is called Emission Trading. In our case this is also the most interesting 
one. The theoretical purpose of this mechanism is that a limited amount of quotas is 
released on the market within a country or a group of countries. This way the government 
can control the amount of emissions, and the lower the limit is set, the bigger pressure is on 
reducing emissions. This will in theory lead to a higher price on the quotas which can be 
traded among companies to make the reductions cost-efficient. As a consequence of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA) created the 
Emission Trading Scheme, which can be seen as a pioneer project in reducing emission by 
using market forces. Before looking into the ETS in detail, we believe it is useful to see how 
these market forces works in theory and we will in the next section explain how theoretical 
models handles emission reductions.  
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1.7 Economic theory models relevant for taxation and cap & trade 22 
We have seen how greenhouse gas emissions have an impact on the environment. We can 
claim that a market failure has appeared regarding emissions, since the world has emitted 
more than what is sustainable for our planet. This is one of the largest examples that a 
competitive market can be economically inefficient, because it is unable to inform the 
consumers of the real costs they are exposed to. A negative externality has lead to market 
failure, because the real costs or benefits are not shown in the market price.  By definition, 
an externality is an action by either a producer or consumer which affects other market 
participants, but is not accounted for in the market price.  Pollution is such a form of 
negative externality. The typical feature of a negative externality is that the polluter will 
choose to locate itself on a higher activity level which imposes more negative consequences 
than what is socio-economic efficient. We say the incentives of individual actors differ from 
the interest of the general public. This can be illustrated by the following figures which 
assume that participants are price takers in the market. 
 
Figure 1.8a Individual     Figure 1.8b Industry  
In the example to the left, the individual polluter choose to position where P=MC. Since we 
have negative externalities, Marginal Social Cost (MSC) of the emissions will be higher than 
Marginal Cost (MC), and we get a difference called Marginal Economic Cost (MEC). For the 
industry curves on the right, we see that the efficient output Q* is lower than the actual Q1, 
and the present price P1 is lower than P* would have been in a regulated market where 
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companies would adapt at Q*. We clearly see the environmental inefficiency of a negative 
externality, illustrated by the yellow triangle representing the cost of society.   
1.7.1 Local vs. global pollution 
Due to the recognition of environmental danger and the impact pollution causes, 
movements of politicians and other interest groups tries to reduce these negative 
externalities. We can separate between pollution that has a local and global impact. A local 
impact means that the consequences only arise within a certain area, while a global problem 
affects everyone. An example of local pollution and waste that is relatively easy to measure 
is the waste from a specific household. In Switzerland you need to buy specific bags at the 
super market, to be able to get your household waste picked up by the municipality’s 
garbage trucks every week. Each bag is taxed with a small amount which is meant to cover 
handling and environmental costs of the waste. On a global basis you have more market 
participants and problems as how to measure, allocate and regulate arises. An obvious 
problem is the free passenger problem, which means that by standing outside the 
regulations you would get a competitive advantage at producing emission intensive 
products. An individual actor has no incentives to reduce its emissions.  The Kyoto Protocol 
was designed in hope to deal with this problem and reduce greenhouse emissions on a 
global basis. In general we can say local regulations are easier to shape and execute than 
global regulations. But we have examples of global agreements, which have succeeded. 
During the eighties researchers figured out the negative impact CFC-gases had on the ozone 
layer in the atmosphere, and in 1989 the Montreal convention was signed in order to stop 
the emissions of these gases. Due to the fact that the CFC-gases take years to decompose, 
we can first now report of a decrease in CFC emissions, and 20 years after the Montreal 
convention we can declare it as a success23.  
1.7.2 Efficient reduction level 
We assume that every company makes their output and hence emissions decisions 
independently in order to position themselves where they maximize profits. This follows the 
arguments above. This assumption can also be transferred to an industry or a country’s 
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economy in our example. If governments want companies or countries to reduce pollution 
and negative externalities, they can implement measures as for example taxes and quotas 
linked to the emissions. Market forces will then lead to a cost efficient reduction. At the 
same time there is a limit of how much a country shall reduce their emissions before it gets 
socio-economical inefficient. If a country so far has introduced few or no ways of reducing 
their emissions, it will be easier and less costly to reduce their emissions by one pollution 
unit. But when the emission reductions increases, the costs of reductions will also increase. 
It can even be efficient to clean less, if they are placed to the left of point E* in the next 
figure. Here the abatement costs will be higher than the social cost saved from the cleaning. 
 
Figure 1.9 MCA and MSC curves 
As this figure illustrates, it can be socio-economical efficient to make a country that has 
negative externalities reduce their emissions. We assume that in an unregulated market, the 
country will locate itself where Marginal Cost of Abatement (MCA) meets the x-axis. The 
socio-economic equilibrium is found at point E* where MSC meets MCA. To make this 
happen, the regulating authorities must make companies position at point E*. The Kyoto 
Protocol in our case, has decided that a 5.2 percent reduction to 1990 level by 2012 is point 
E* for this period. We claimed that taxes or quotas could be appropriate measures to reach 
that goal, so we will now present the theoretical framework behind this. 
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1.7.3 Tax versus cap 
If a company, industry or whole economy wants to reach a desired emission level, an 
emission standard can be introduced. This puts a maximum limit of how much the company 
can pollute. In the model above this would implicate that the maximum level of emissions 
would be limited to E*. The other solution would be to introduce an emission tax per 
pollution unit. When introducing a fee, the polluter would choose to reduce emissions as 
long as the marginal cost of abatement is smaller than the fee. If this fee is set similar to the 
value of P* in our model, we will achieve the same result as if an emission quota of E* is put 
through.  
 
  
Figure 1.10a Tax       Figure 1.10b Quota 
The two figures above show us that using either taxes or quotas will give us the same result. 
Pindyck & Rubinfeld takes basis in a simple supply and demand cross when explaining the 
impact of a tax or quota. We suppose we are in a competitive market where price is equal to 
marginal cost and the government imposes a tax of t dollars per pollution unit. This means 
that the price the buyer pays must be t dollars more than the price the seller receives. In the 
figure 1.10a above, the starting point is in position Q* and P*. We are in the market 
equilibrium and supply is the same as demand. When the tax is imposed, the seller must 
raise its price equal to the size of the tax, not to incur a deficit as big as the tax. The supply 
curve will therefore shift to the left and we get a new equilibrium in the economy at quantity 
Q1.  P buyer is the new price paid by the buyers. This is equal to the price sellers receive, 
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plus the tax. In this example with equal elasticity the tax burden is shared equally between 
seller and buyer. The price is changed for both supplier and buyer, where the buyer must 
pay more and seller receives less. We see that the tax results in a change in consumer 
surplus ∆CS=-A-C and producer surplus ∆PS=-B-D. The new governmental tax revenue is A+B 
so in total the tax gives a deadweight loss to the producer and consumer similar to C+D.  
The effects shown under taxes can also be achieved by using quotas. The regulating 
authorities simply introduce a supply restriction. The maximum quota limit must be set 
equal to point Q1 in figure 1.10b. At quantity Q1 the new supply curve will appear as 
vertical, because it is no longer allowed to supply more than the quota limit. Who that gains 
the profit from this policy, depends on how the government allocates the quotas. If they are 
given out, companies get the gain, opposite to an auction where the profit would belong to 
the government as under taxation. 
The reasoning above seems convincing and no matter what policy chosen, the outcome will 
be equal. But in a real world this is not the fact. This is due to uncertainty of the location and 
varying gradient of the abatement and social cost curves in figure 1.9, the outcome may 
differ quite a lot. New technology development and different marginal costs between 
companies makes it hard to determine the abatement cost curve. The marginal social cost 
curve can be difficult to determine due to individual preferences.  
The valuable advantage by choosing a quota approach is that the final limit of emissions can 
be determined. This is why this is the chosen policy of the Kyoto Protocol. But if quotas are 
to be handed out in an efficient way, it would demand full information of the abatement 
cost curves of every nation and emitting company within the country. This is an impossible 
task. Therefore the quotas have been made tradable. This solves the problem that the 
regulating authorities no longer need detailed information about each individual emitter. 
Under this system each company are allocated a certain allowance available for emissions. If 
they need more, they must buy them from other firm that holds a transferable quota. A 
company will sell their quota at a price similar to its alternative value. Alternatively an 
auction finds place and the companies need to buy the emission quotas from this market. 
Government will then get the quota income. The total numbers of quotas are chosen to 
reach the desired maximum level of emissions. The regulated free market will by itself 
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allocate the quotas among the firms and the abating efforts will be done by those 
participants who can do them the cheapest way.  The regulating and market based policy 
have merged and created a combined instrument.  
1.7.4 Who has to pay for the quotas? 
Now as we have examined how governments can reduce emissions by applying either an tax 
or cap and trade system, the next step will be to investigate who that will carry the costs.  In 
figures 1.10a and 1.10b above, tax or quota costs are equally shared between buyer and 
supplier. The curves elasticities are relatively equal to each other.  This does not necessarily 
have to be the case. The cost allocation depends on the elasticity of the supply and demand 
functions. If demand is relatively inelastic and supply relatively elastic, most of the tax 
burden must be carried by the buyers. Naturally, if the situation is the other way around, the 
sellers must cover the tax burden. We can summarize this in a “pass-through” formula 
where we see how much of the tax burden the buyers must carry.  
Pass-through fraction for buyers = Es / (Es-Ed) 
The effect can be studied in this figure, where demand is inelastic relative to the supply 
curve. We clearly see that buyers must cover most of the quota cost.   
 
Figure 1.11 Inelastic demand and quota 
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This figure fits well together with the situation for electricity. As reported, the demand for 
electricity is inelastic. This would mean that the consumers would have to carry the majority 
of the cost occurring due to the imposed quotas. As we can see in the figure above, the 
quota price will largely be transferred to the consumers. A small part will be covered by 
producers, as we recognize a small decline in quantity supplied. This occurs because at the 
new price inclusive quota cost the demand will not satisfy the production cost of all previous 
producers. We keep in mind that some thermal plants keep production going even though 
price is lower than marginal costs because of ramping, start and stop costs. This is of course 
still relevant, and can lead to that the producers cover more of the quota cost.  If the state of 
the market is oligopolistic, we might see that producers carry an even larger part of the 
quota costs due to political pressure.   
In areas with extensive supply of hydropower, the time where generators with quota needs 
will be price setters, is of interest. The market price will then be affected by the quota price. 
If the marginal opportunity cost of the water is high, we might have a situation where 
hydropower is more valuable than the marginal cost of thermal production plus the CO2 
quota, known as marginal opportunity cost of the water resources. We can experience this 
typically in years with low precipitation. With oversupply of water hydropower can also be 
the price setter, but now prices will be lower than the fossil fuel cost and hence not affected 
by CO2 quotas. The cost of energy production from fossil energy sources will vary in regards 
to raw material input and efficiency of the power plant. Plant efficiency decides the carbon 
intensity and tells us the CO2 emitted per kWh electricity. Further this decides how many 
quotas that are needed and hence the cost of electricity.  Gjesdal concludes that most of the 
quota costs will be carried by the end-consumers24. His findings fit well with the theoretical 
presentation in this section. In general we will experience higher electricity prices with CO2 
allowances, which must be paid by the end-consumers.  
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 Gjesdal, Price effects of CO2 Quotas on the Nordic Electricity Market, 2008 
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2.0 Norway – A Similar Case 
2.1 Power market in Norway before restructuring  25  
Traditionally power markets around the world were organized as privately owned utilities 
with public regulation or the utilities were owned either centralized by the government or 
decentralized by the state, counties and municipalities. The latter was the case in 
Scandinavia and the Norwegian market before the restructuring of the electricity market 
starting in 1990. The situation led to monopolies in the area where the utility had the 
concession to operate, and consumers had to buy electricity from the supplier available in 
the area.  
The production characteristics in Norway were the same then as now, almost all electricity 
production came from hydropower. The industry was fragmented, the production sector 
consisted of almost 70 electricity generators and there were around 230 network owners in 
the system. It was some vertical integration among these firms, where examples were to be 
found especially at regional and local level. About 85 perfect of the network firms were 
publicly owned. Statkraft, a public owned company, accounted for approximately one third 
of the total generation of around 108 TWh in 1991. Statkraft also controlled 70% of the 
transmission grid and had the sole responsibility for electricity imports and exports.  
On the demand side about 90 percent of the power was sold on bilateral long term 
contracts, with energy intensive industry demanding about one-third of the energy need. 
Power producers who had the concession for the actual area negotiated non-standarized 
“over the counter” contracts with their customers. If the demand exceeded capacity, 
producers had to buy power from other concession areas. Due to this market design, the 
electricity market could be characterized as inflexible and non-transparent, and the 
authorities had to monitor the prices and set a maximum price. The Statkraft price was 
therefore set as a base price and was regulated once a year.  
The remaining 10 percent of the annual power production was not sold through bilateral 
long term contracts. Due to the characteristics of hydropower, both over and undersupply of 
occasional power can occur in the market. Therefore a market for spot transactions, called 
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Samkjøringen, was already established in 1972 to handle this short term market and keep 
the transmission grid frequency on the desired level at 50 Hertz. This would later figure as a 
pre-ancestor for the later market design.  
2.2 Motivation for restructuring 
In a regulated market inefficiencies are likely to occur. Prior to the restructuring, the market 
worked as a cost reimbursement system and incentives for being cost efficient were low. 
The Statkraft base price was set to match long run marginal cost, but the market price did 
not reflect the investment level of new capacity. Production and capacity investments were 
covered by either direct or indirect subsidies from the government. When capacity and 
actual supply differ, inefficiencies in production arise. Before the restructuring, water was 
spilled in a normal year due to overcapacity. Inefficiencies in production were therefore a 
motivation factor to restructure.  
On consumer level, prices differed widely among customer groups. Energy intensive industry 
paid prices as low as one third of households26. If we look on the electricity revenue aspect 
on its own, this policy reduces the social welfare. Important to take into consideration is the 
widespread district policy in Norway that wants to keep local communities sustainable by 
offering profitable economical conditions. Then the question of a differentiated price will 
turn more complicated. But the net loss accrued from the price discrimination in 
distribution, was estimated to be around 3.7 and 4.5 Billion NOK per year according to 
several studies done by Bye, Strøm and Johnsen27. Also in the transmission grid, researchers 
believe inefficiencies occurred because of the lack of competition. With this as a background 
politicians decided to restructure the electricity market to make participants economical 
rational by introducing a market based exchange system in the hope of making the 
electricity industry more economical efficient. 
2.3 How the new market was designed 
Bye and Hope writes in their article that a fully market based power system must contain the 
following five design elements to be complete. 
                                                          
26 Bye & Strøm, Kraftpriser og kraftforbruk, 1987 
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 Bye & Hope, Deregulation of Electricity Markets – The Norwegian Experience, 2005 
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- Market for trade in electricity 
- A financial market where power derivatives in order to handle risk. 
- A short-term market for production capacity and balancing supply and demand 
- Market for investing in new capacity 
- Markets for trade in emission derivatives.  
In the Nordic market we find four out of these five elements, which now will be presented. A 
market for investing in new capacity is still absent.  
 
Figure 2.1 
28
 Wholesale and retail market 
Rud identifies two main markets in the electric industry and separates into the wholesale 
and retail market. This figure shows the design of the electricity industry in Norway. Trade in 
the wholesale market can find place either through the power exchange or through a 
bilateral trade between the participants going on over the counter (OTC). At the exchange 
we have both the physical and financial market. These market deserves to be elaborated 
more to give a broader understanding of how the industry was restructured.  
2.4 The wholesale market 
The Nordic wholesale market is organized as a power exchange, called Nord Pool, which 
handles physical and financial trade in power contracts within the Nordic countries. Nord 
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Pool offers the largest and most liquid market place for physical and financial power 
contracts in Europe. Nord Pool is the central counter party in all trades, and creates a secure 
market where producers, distributors, brokers or large companies can buy and sell power. 
Nord Pool Spot which handles the physical market covers more than 70% of the physical 
trade done in the Nordic market for electricity. In 2009 Nord Pool Spot had an annual 
turnover of 285.5 TWh which in monetary values is equivalent to about 10.7 billion Euros29.  
2.4.1 The physical markets 
2.4.1.1 Elspot 
On the elspot market hourly contracts for physical delivery in the next day’s 24 hours period 
are traded. This is called the day-ahead-market, and participants are obliged to buy and sell 
the agreed contracts. The Nord Pool aggregates the purchase bids to a demand curve and 
the sale offers to a supply curve, and comes up with an equilibrium price. This specific price 
is called the hourly spot price, or sometimes also the system price, and appears where the 
two curves intersect. It is important to mention that this spot price does not consider 
bottlenecks in the congestion grid. 
 
Figure 2.2 30 Spot price 06.02.10 
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As we can see from this image gathered from Nord Pool, the system price in the Nord Pool 
area is 49.38 between 08.00 and 09.00 on the 6st of February 2010. But in six out of total 
eight areas the price is higher and in NO2 and DK1 the price is lower. In these two areas we 
recognize an excess supply, more than the capacity in the grid can handle and transport to 
the six other regions.  
2.4.1.2 Regulating power market 
The regulating power market is a balancing market and its main purpose is to correct for 
supply and demand differences that occur because of transmission constrains between 
different price areas. As we saw in figure 2.2, we might have a situation with either excess 
supply or excess demand in one area. Then a special price will be set in those areas 
influenced by the bottlenecks. Relatively to the spot price the price will be set down in the 
area with excess supply and up where we experience excess demand. This measure is taken 
to make sure the congestion grid will not be overloaded. The Transmission System Operator 
(TSO) Statnett is responsible to regulate this upward or downward capacity change. The TSO 
chooses which producer or consumer that must change its supply or demand from the same 
bids and offers that creates the market equilibrium given in the spot price. The participant 
with the lowest price offer for the volume change needed is chosen. Naturally this problem 
at hand is only relevant for participants with a considerable size in the market. 
2.4.1.2 Elbas 
Elbas is a compliment to the spot market and an alternative to the regulating power market. 
In the Elbas market the participants continuously can perform cross boarder intra-day 
trading. Trade can be made until one hour of delivery, and this feature is meant to balance 
the supply and demand in the market. All the trade on the elbas market is meant to utilize 
the cross boarder capacity and reduce the regulating power market performed by the 
TSO’s.31 This has proven to economically efficient for all participants.  
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2.4.2 The financial markets 
The financial market is an instrument to trade price securing contracts. These are demanded 
in the market for the purpose to hedge and manage risks connected to changes in the 
market price for electricity. The risk can be illustrated in the simple, following figure where 
buyer holds a long spot position in the asset. +p and –p illustrates possible future profit or 
loss at time T, while p0 is the price today. 
 
Figure 2.3 
32
 Financial contracts 
There are four types of derivatives traded on Nord Pool that are designed to reduce risk. 
These are futures, forward, options and contracts for difference (CDF)33. A future contract is 
a standardized contract that sets a price for a given quantity at a certain time in the future. A 
forward contract has many of the same qualities, but is non-standardized. What that differs 
futures and forwards from an option contract, is that by options you must pay a fee upfront 
and you get a right, but not an obligation to exercise the contract.  Finally, CDFs enables 
participants to hedge against price area risks. The reference price for the derivatives is the 
spot price. For all the derivative contracts, there is no physical delivery of electricity, they are 
pure financial instruments.  
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The physical and financial markets can be summarized in this figure. 
 
Figure 2.4 
34
 Physical and financial markets 
2.4.3 Emission derivatives 
A separate market at Nord Pool is the emission derivatives market. Nord Pool provides 
trading, clearing and delivery of European Union emission allowances (EUAs) and certified 
emission reduction s (CERs) for the whole Kyoto period. This will be explained closer in 
section 2.7 about the European Trading Scheme.  
Nord Pool also offers a clearing service which settles the contracts made over the counter 
(OTC) in the bilateral market. This reduces the risk for the trading parties. According to Nord 
Pool’s own statement that the spot price is the reference price for the bilateral market, we 
can say that the transparency of the power exchange strongly affects the prices on OTC’s, so 
that the wholesale market can be seen as one both on and off the power exchange. 
2.5 The retail market 
The largest end users have the possibility to buy electricity directly in the wholesale market 
at the power exchange, but talking about the retail market we focus on those who buy 
electricity from a distributor. We have learned that the Nordic wholesale market is 
integrated. For the retail markets this is not the case, the retail markets are still divided into 
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domestically markets. This is due to technical, regulatory and commercial barriers35. A 
consumer can choose among more than a hundred suppliers domestically. Some deliver 
their services in certain areas only, but the availability of suppliers is still large enough that 
we can state that the market is competitive. The retail market design allows companies that 
do not have their own production to compete in the retail market. They are intermediaries 
in the supply chain. Around 50,000 customers change supplier each quarter36. This is about 
2.5 percent of the households. The price paid by end users is dependent on how efficient 
both the wholesale and retail market is. Important to remember is that the price the end 
consumer pays, is not only the spot price. The electricity price is finally put together by 
distributor charges, network charges, a special electricity tax and the value added tax of 25 
percent. The last couple of years the wholesale price has made up around 40-45 percent of 
the total price paid by consumers, while network charge and taxes in total have respectively 
made up around one fourth and one third of the total price37. 
In general, household customers can now choose among three different contracts types. 
Electricity distributors take the advantage of price differentiation methods and differences in 
peoples risk willingness.  The most common contracts are as following. 
- Spot contracts: Price follows the Nord Pool’s spot price, plus a margin. Contract 
may have a max or min limit, and price may be calculated as daily or monthly 
average.  
- Standard variable: Price varies according to the spot price on Nord Pool, but price 
changes must be given with a two week notice. Prices are in general a bit higher 
than spot, due to higher risk for the distributors. 
- Set prices: Prices are normally set on a one year time basis and represents on 
average the highest price due to distributor risks.   
Around 10 percent chose set prices in 2007, and the remaining 90 percent were split equally 
between spot and standard variable contracts38. Since the deregulation found place, a 
technical revolution has found place in terms of information access. Now, price information 
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from each supplier can be easily found on the Internet and process of changing supplier is 
very simple. This makes the switching costs very low, and due to the transparent market it is 
hard to charge a price higher than the market price.  Restrictions in the transmission grid and 
extensive market power should be the only reasons why market power would occur.  
2.6 Results of the restructuring 
2.6.1 Prices and consumption 
One of the main motivations to restructure was the fact that prices did not decide the 
production capacity. After the restructuring new investments in capacity did not occur and 
excess capacity was now released into the market, instead of being spilled to keep prices 
artificially high. As a result prices dropped close to short run marginal cost, and together 
with the efficiency gain from the new accrued competition between suppliers, electricity got 
cheaper for the consumers and approached the new spot price. This could happen as the 
direct control over generating utilities was abandoned and end-users could now participate 
in the spot market.  
The price gap between customer groups has declined since the restructuring, and for the 
industry sector this means higher prices. This problem has raised great concerns in rural 
areas where local communities heavily rely on corner stone energy intensive industries that 
run the economy. If we look at the welfare loss from electricity directly, the restructuring 
seems as economically efficient and goes in line with economical theory. But in Norway with 
a spread population, where district politics is an important theme at every political election, 
other preferences may be more valuable than economically correct allocation of energy 
resources. The government therefore decided to keep on providing energy intensive sectors 
with favorable conditions from the state owned Statkraft. Prices are as low as 0.05 – 0.20 
NOK/kWh, and in 2006 such contracts counted for as much as 16.9 TWh/year. Last year 
Statkrafts estimated loss was around one billion NOK due to sales of cheap industry power39. 
The last contracts will run out in 2011, and an extension of these contracts is questionable 
because of European Union competition regulations40.  
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In the longer run after the restructuring, prices were expected to rise. The economical 
development experienced during the 1990’s and 2000 demanded a steady growth in 
electricity consumption and the previous available capacity was now utilized. In the long run 
it is natural for the electricity prices to be close to the long run marginal cost, as demand will 
continue to grow, new investments must be made and financed by higher electricity prices. 
In addition the restructuring opened up new export opportunities where excess capacity 
could be sold. Investments were made in transmission capacity and excess capacity was now 
sold to foreign markets. If domestic electricity demand continues to grow, Norway will be in 
a state where more efficient utilization of existing plants must be encouraged and 
possibilities for new investments in capacity created, to keep Norway’s position as a net 
exporter of electricity in a normal year.   
The figure 2.5 shows the development of the wholesale electricity price from 1996 to 2008.  
 
Figure 2.5 41 Wholesale prices 1996-2008 
Figure 2.6 shows the last years development in detail. 
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Figure 2.6 42 Wholesale prices Nord Pool 2008-2010 
During the 1990’s wholesale prices were still low. Wholesale prices held a level between 
0.10 and 0.20 NOK per kWh from the restructuring in 1993 until the beginning of the 21st 
century, except some short peak periods as the one in the beginning of figure 2.5. Little 
precipitation in 1996 pressed the prices upwards. The very high prices experienced at the 
turn of the year 2002/2003 was due to cold weather and unusual little precipitation in the 
fall, which led to low water levels in the reservoirs. In 2006 a combination of a low water 
level together with all time high prices of fossil fuels and the introduction of CO2 quotas 
pressed the price upwards. Overall it seems as the spot price has more doubled since the 
restructuring, which is only confirmed if we closely study the last two years prices as well. 
The extreme peak in February 2010 was due to extreme cold weather, closed nuclear plants 
in Sweden and trouble with the transmission grid. We also recognize that prices vary during 
seasons due to factors mentioned previous in this thesis. 
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Figure 2.7
 43
 Gross consumption Norway 1994-2007 
The yearly consumption has not been much affected by the increase in price. Statistics 
Norway provides the necessarily data to make the graph of the gross consumption since 
1994. The declines in 1996, 2001 and 2006 can partly be assigned to the higher prices. But it 
is reasonable to believe that other factors as weather conditions, the IT bubble and the 9/11 
attacks influence on the general economy have more to say.  
2.6.2 Market concentration 
The power industry has traditionally had a strong position in the Nordic countries and the 
inhabitants have felt a certain and proud identity to the industry and its participating 
companies. Power companies were owned by either the government on a national, regional 
or municipal level. The social democratic party has had the leading political position the last 
century. This made a privatization of the companies not politically feasible and the 
restructuring happened without changes in ownership structures. The kept ownership 
structure is why we consequently use the expression restructuring instead of deregulation. 
But this does not exclude the fact that many companies were split vertically, now with a 
producing and distributing division. The large amount of companies regardless of their 
ownership structure was thought to be enough to secure a well functioning market. Since 
the restructuring we have seen some horizontal integration among companies, where large 
companies have acquired smaller ones. Cross ownership of companies and joint ownership 
of production plants have also developed to a significant extensiveness. In the Norwegian 
market Statkraft holds a 30.2 percent direct generation capacity. When the indirect 
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ownerships are taken into account, this number increases to 42.4 percent and the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index44 reaches the value of 199745. A concentration of 1800 or more is 
considered to be a highly concentrated marketplace. The competition authorities are 
therefore monitoring price developments carefully, so Statkraft can not exercise market 
power. The creation of a greater market by including the other Nordic countries was a key 
step to decrease market concentration, and the concentration on the overall Nordic market 
today is considered to be quite low46. But still, usage of market power is sometimes detected 
even without bottlenecks in the grid. It must therefore be monitored and enforced by the 
competition authorities to secure fair prices.  
2.7 The European Trading Scheme ETS 
The ETS was introduced in subsection 1.6.6 as the European solution to one of the flexible 
mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol. It is now time to explain the ETS more in detail and show 
what impact it has on prices and Norway as a producer of hydro electric power. The ETS is 
the EU’s response to help member states reach the emission obligations in the Kyoto 
Protocol. Currently only emissions of CO2 gases are included in the scheme, but plans to 
include additional greenhouse gases are under consideration. When designing the market 
for greenhouse gas emissions reductions, the European Union decided to make use of the 
cap and trade technique. As we have seen in the theoretical part, a main advantage with this 
approach is the fact that total emission level can be decided. In this way the EU wants to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an efficient and cost effective way. The possibility to 
trade the allowances makes the emission cuts to be achieved at the least cost. The scheme 
currently covers more than 10,000 installations with a net heat of 20 MW or more in the 
energy and industrial sectors that counts for more than half of the CO2 emissions and 40 
percent of the total greenhouse gas emissions47. The sectors currently under influence by 
the scheme are power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron 
and steel plants, cement factories, glass, lime, brick, ceramic, pulp, paper and board 
producers. The following allowance contracts are available today. 
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- European Union Emission Allowances (EUA) products can be found as future, 
option or newly introduced also spot contracts. EUA’s purpose is to trade EU 
emission allowances in standardized contracts.   
- Certified Emission Reduction (CER) can be traded in the same three contracts 
forms as EUA’s. CER’s has been introduced as a consequence of the CDM 
mechanism which is mentioned in subsection 1.6.6. Its mission is to serve the 
market as cost-efficient, cleared and standardized contract for trade in emission 
reductions in developing countries48.  
2.7.1 What factors have an impact on the quota price?   
Støyva49 reports in his thesis that the same factors that have influence on electricity price 
will also be of current interest when the price of CO2 allowances is determined. Weather 
conditions will affect electricity demand and precipitation, wind and solar days determines 
how much power that can be created from quota independent technologies.  Economic 
activity and price elasticity will affect the amount of electricity demanded. Prices of fossil 
fuels will determine the order of production technologies and hence the amount of quotas 
needed. Coal for example produces more than twice the amount of emissions per kWh 
compared to natural gas.  
The quota system is a new installation and as most other markets it needs time to develop. 
Unavailability of accurate market data can influence the price. Uncertainty has been a strong 
price driver since the beginning of the quota regime. Rules and regulations, how quotas are 
allocated and how they work are typical problematic issues that have been raised. How 
much of the emission reductions that must be done domestically is a good example on such 
a problem. In the second period this is limited to 90 percent50. The Kyoto Protocol is only 
valid until 2012, and its future development is under continuous questioning. An abandoning 
will lead to less investment in green technology and higher prices on quotas in the present 
period.  
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2.7.2 The first ETS period 2005 – 2007 
The first period was meant as a test period where the market should be built, designed and 
developed in a way to facilitate for the following periods. The necessarily infrastructure had 
to be organized so a dynamic market for CO2 allowances could be created. In the first period 
quotas were given out on the basis of historical emission levels. Reduction of emissions was 
quite low, and since the quota price is dependent on the scarcity of emissions available, it 
was not a surprise that the quota prices were close to zero in the end of the period. The 
development of the price can be seen in the figure under. 
 
Figure 2.8 
51
 Quota price first ETS period 
 
The figure shows the development in the EUR future contract with settlement in the last 
month of the first period. We chose this contract out of simplicity. Contracts with settlement 
in December 2005 and 2006 could also have been used, since a “banking and borrowing” 
policy within the period existed. This means that quotas could be used at the time preferred 
within a trading period. This might create incentives for strategic purchasing and stocking of 
allowances. In general, prices with shorter settlement date will be priced a bit lower due to 
lower time risk. This is also the case for CO2 quotas, but the price with settlement in 
December 2007 represents the price quite well. The difference is normally around 0.50 Euro, 
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but it naturally increases closer to settlement date due to more information and reduced 
risk. We see that prices started off around 20-25 Euros per metric ton CO2 allowance. The 
availability of accurate market data were in the start-up phase missing and led to a price 
increase. When verified emission data were released in 2006, it led to a drop in prices 
because the market anticipated an over allocation of quotas. Around the beginning of 2007, 
the market anticipated an oversupply of quotas. Together with the fact that quotas from the 
first period could not be banked and transferred to the next period, it made the dramatic 
price drop occur. This criterion was changed when the scheme went into its second period.  
2.7.3 The second ETS period 2008-2012  
We are currently in the middle of the second ETS period, also known as the Kyoto period. In 
this period countries must fulfill the emission targets planned by the Protocol. A similar 
uncertainty experienced in the first period can also be recognized in the second. But unlike 
period one, have the prices kept a certain level. Prices seem to have stabilized at around 15 
Euro per ton and it seems as a stabile market has been created. We are still more than two 
and a half years from the end of the period, but the market seems confident that the current 
quota regime manages to regulate the market in an adequate way. Scarcity of quotas has 
increased from a total of 2.15 billion tons available in the first period, to 2.08 billion tons in 
period two52. We can expect some price changes in the end of the period, as information on 
supply and demand will be clearer. But quotas from period two can now be “banked” and 
used in period three. This is expected to reduce the dramatic price drop seen in 2007. 
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Figure 2.9 
53
 Quota price second ETS period  
2.7.4 The next ETS period 2013 – 2020  
There are great possibilities and a strong hope that the EU will continue its emission trading 
scheme.  Despite some teething problems, the scheme has proven to be efficient.  
“No one talks about under-performance in Europe since 2005 because of the carbon price. 
Changes have occurred in certain industries, but the notion that the carbon price would 
wreck the overall economy is clearly disproved for the European system, which for a long 
time had a high price compared to what was expected.”  
A. Denny Ellerman MIT Energy Initiative54 
To be able to reach its goal of 21 percent reduction within 2020 compared to 1990 levels, 
the system must be continued and improved to help the EU reach the goal cost efficiently. 
The emission decrease will follow a linear line each year to reach the target of a maximum 
emission level of 1.72 billion ton per year in 2020. Previous quotas have been given out for 
free. From 2012 a much larger share must be auctioned, which means they must be bought 
by those who need them. Airlines and producers of aluminum and ammonia will be new 
entrants in this period. This is expected to lead to more pressure on the price.  
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2.7.5 Impact on electricity price in Norway 
In period one all quotas were given out for free. In period two only 10 percent were 
auctioned. In the next period EU wants to start by auctioning out 60 percent in 2013 and 
then increase this percentage the following years. The power sector must buy the required 
allowances on auctions. Due to the inelastic demand, the power sector has been able to pass 
on the increased cost of the CO2 allowances to their customers. The power sector is not 
threatened by comparative advantages from other part of the world in terms of electricity 
production. Due to the physical characteristics of electricity transmission we experience 
geographical markets. The EU expects end-consumer electricity prices to rise around 10 to 
15 percent by 2020 compared to business as usual without CO2 quotas. The price and 
volatility of fossil fuels is likely to have a much greater impact on prices. Some may fear that 
since electricity producers now must participate in quota auctions, it will make the prices on 
electricity higher. The EU believes this is not the case, as producers already pass on most of 
their quota costs to their customers due to alternative value the quotas represents. 
Therefore a free allocation or not, should not make a difference, except eliminating windfall 
profits for some electricity producers that manages to reduce emission targets cheaper than 
the quota cost. 
For Norway as a producer of hydro electricity, the introduction of quotas means that the 
alternative value of the water increases since the most expensive power that enters the 
system decides the price. Production costs will stay the same, as hydropower emit close to 
zero CO2 emissions. Hydropower generators experience a windfall profit. Since the owners 
of hydropower production companies in Norway are mostly owned by the government in 
some way, this profit will gain the public. Simultaneously, foreign producers are not always 
price setters in the Norwegian market. When Norwegian producers have excess capacity of 
power, CO2 quotas will not affect the price. This will happen in wet period where 
hydropower is price setter because of limitations in transmission capacity for exports. Prices 
will be lower than marginal cost of the most expensive production method plus the CO2 
quota. In dry periods, the alternative value of the water will be higher because of the limited 
import capacity, and we will experience higher prices than foreign prices since hydropower 
now is the most expensive production method due to the marginal opportunity cost. 
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Støyva tries to figure out CO2 quotas impact on the Nordic electricity price. In his theoretical 
part, he claims that 42 percent of the quota price is transferable to the Nordic market. The 
empirical analysis finds a somewhat higher impact, but this turns out that these results are 
hard to prove statistically. Støyva makes several key assumptions when finding these 
numbers that may influence the outcome. We find it reasonable to assume a somewhat 
higher number than 42 percent. According to analyst Lasse Torgersen in ECON Pöyry, the 
price effect in Norway will be about 0.10 NOK in a normal year, while the quotas have made 
it 0.14-0.15 NOK more expensive to produce one kWh from a coal plant55. We therefore 
roughly assume that the price in the Norway will be influenced by the European market with 
coal as the price setting production method and the CO2 quota price, about 60 to 70 percent 
of the time, where the price sometimes could even be higher than in Europe because of the 
future marginal opportunity cost. Hence will the price be lower than the European price 30-
40 percent of the time because of oversupply and restrictions in the transmission grid. With 
a generation of about 130 TWh/year, 0.10 NOK per kWh means an income from CO2 quotas 
of approximately 13 Billion NOK per year for Norwegian electricity generators and their 
owners.  
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3.0 Future Potential for Hydro-Québec and the Province 
We have until now focused on a theoretical approach of the electricity industry, we have 
been introduced to the Québec electricity market and seen the motivations for 
restructuring, discussed strength and weaknesses of environmental regulations and we have 
given an insight into the experience of the Norwegian restructuring. We strongly believe this 
gives a necessarily understanding and knowledge, when we now look into the possibilities 
for the province of Québec to restructure its own electricity market.  
3.1 Restructuring the market in Québec  
A restructuring of the electricity market in Québec to a situation where the electricity price is 
decided by the market, would remove the efficiency loss described in figure 1.5. Prices 
would reflect marginal opportunity cost of electricity and it would lead to a more efficient 
use of the resources. Hydro-Québec would regain the surplus that today is given to the 
consumers and its profit would go to the company’s owner which is the government. This 
sounds easy in its simplicity, but several obstacles are in the way of restructuring the 
electricity market in Québec. We will now discuss how we would recommend designing a 
restructured market and which consequences this would mean for Hydro-Québec and the 
inhabitants of the province.  
Clark and Leach discusses the potential for an electricity market restructuring in Québec56. 
Their two main focuses lie on an alteration of the production sector and which political 
issues this would imply. Unlike other regulatory regimes, the main goal of a restructuring in 
Québec is not necessarily higher efficiency on the production level. It is rather an efficient 
use of electricity by consumers, which have access to the cheapest electricity prices in North 
America57. The Heritage Pool policy is the reason for these low prices and it leads to great 
profit redistributions from the producer Hydro-Québec to its customers, in form of the 
cheap electricity prices.  
A deregulation of the industry with a following subdivision of the producing plants, would 
not lead to increased competition to any great extend. If we take a look at the Hydro-
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Québec facilities, they are few and utilities a small amount of watersheds. La Grande is the 
largest river system with 14,354 MW installed capacity. This counts for 32.4 percent of the 
total capacity in Québec.  The total capacity of Québec’s generating fleet is 36,810 MW, but 
if we count in power purchase agreements with small private suppliers and the Atlantic 
provinces total capacity amounts to 44,192 MW. To illustrate the Québec situation we 
present a map over Hydro-Québec’s major facilities. 
 
Figure 3.1 58 Map Quebec 
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Generation is fairly concentrated and the small amount of river systems and producing 
installations makes a restructuring complicated. If Hydro-Québec would hold the same 
ownership position as today, Clark and Leach estimates the HHI to be 6140. This indicated a 
very high market concentration. Alternatively, a deregulation could find place and the assets 
that are in Hydro-Québec’s ownership today, would be fully divested and sold to individual 
companies. Such a fully divesture of all assets would give an HHI index of 618. This measure 
would lead to a highly competitive market, but is hard to carry out because of the technical 
challenge. Multiple plants per river system namely complicate the possible divesture 
process. The dependency on the same water flow could possibly create conflicts of interest 
between plants and lead to an inefficient use of resources. To divest only in separate river 
system levels is to prefer, but this measure would not be enough to prevent a strong market 
concentration in Québec. As we saw, the operator of the La Grande river system would have 
about 1/3 of the market. We understand that a divesture of the Québec electricity market is 
very hard to go through with in a technical perspective. 
3.1.1 Politics 
Political will is probably a bigger obstacle that must be passed before a restructuring can find 
place. Strong traditions and identity feelings describes the Québec electricity market. A 
deregulation where Hydro-Québec is divested and sold from the government to private 
actors seems unlikely also from a political view. As noted earlier, Hydro-Québec has strong 
traditions and it is associated with the Québecois movement which is important for many 
Québecers. Researchers have shown that Québecers prefer to keep the rates low instead of 
being benefitted with tax-reliefs that would exceed the higher electricity price59. It seems as 
the residents of Québec do not understand that a restructuring can lead to economic rents 
that will benefit them and they strongly want to keep the current ownership structure of 
Hydro-Québec. This thesis will therefore not suggest a sale or divesture of Hydro-Québec. 
Such a restructuring would probably be too hard to accomplish both technically and 
politically.  
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3.1.2 How can a restructured market be designed? 
In this section we can make use of all the knowledge we have learned about the Norwegian 
restructuring and how the Nordic market is designed. Québec and Norway have an equal 
starting point with rich access to water resources. Norway early chose to restructure its 
electricity industry, while Québec has chosen to keep a more conservative line. We believe 
Québec can learn much from the Nordic system. Nord Pool being the first multinational 
power exchange was an early innovator of taking advantage of different countries electricity 
characteristics. If we have a look at the map over the restructured electricity markets in the 
USA, we detect that geographically a similar market could be created in the north east 
corner of the continent. Knowing that Québec’s western neighbor province Ontario also is 
restructured, we can see the contours of a possible electricity pool.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 
60
 Map restructured markets USA 
Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Michigan and Illinois are all states that have 
restructured their electricity market.  The restructured markets in USA are already known 
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with power pools where wholesale electricity is traded. Currently there are three main pools 
known as independent system operators, serving the suggested integrated area. The New 
England61 area and New York both have their own pool, while the PJM pool62 operates the 
wholesale electricity markets in all or parts of 13 other states. As a start it would be natural 
with Québec to integrate with Ontario, New York and the New England pool, since these 
areas have boarder lines to Québec and already transmission interconnectors. Ontario, New 
York and New England also make up the majority of electricity exports from Québec today. 
As we have discussed before, the problem is initially not that Hydro-Québec would exercise 
market power to hold the electricity prices high, but actually to keep them high enough so 
they would reflect the marginal opportunity cost. This solution could make Québec still able 
to keep the ownership of its crown company and at the same time reduce Hydro-Québec’s 
market power so an integrated wholesale market would determine the market price. This 
market price would lead to higher prices in Québec. With only these three areas integrated, 
Hydro-Québec would hold about a quarter of the generating capacity. A further integration 
only including the restructured states of the PJM pool would decrease market concentration 
considerably, encourage efficiency and let the different areas take advantage of different 
production technologies and demand patterns. Hydro-Québec’s market share could then 
potentially be as low as twelve percent.  
The Nordic market is an example of how efficient the creation of a power pool exchange can 
be without having to split up the major producing and governmental owned company in 
each country. In the Nordic countries such a divesture would probably have created political 
unrest, but instead they now have a well functioning market where the price is decided from 
supply and demand. But this market design comes with a price, a transmission grid with the 
desired capacity must be on hand. If there is not enough capacity for electricity to flow from 
low price to high price areas, the market will not be fully efficient, bottlenecks will influence 
the price too much and companies will be able to exercise market power. This is of course a 
problem Québec would have to handle, especially since Hydro-Québec would be the sole 
generator of a certain size in Québec. With an energy board like Regie de l’energie or some 
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kind of competition authorities still controlling and monitoring the prices and market 
situations this problem could be solvable in Québec. What makes this concern smaller in 
Québec’s case is that Québec unlike other markets does not struggle with a company 
exerting market power and charging the customers high prices, because of the 
governmental ownership which gives a certain control. As we have claimed, the problem is 
quite opposite, namely too low prices, which do not give incentives to energy efficiency. The 
problem would be more of a concern in the participating U.S. states where private actors 
control the grid and would try to gain market power to influence the price to their own 
advantage.  A research by Wolak63 reports that a credible regulatory mechanism must 
monitor a restructured market. The Nordic competition authorities have this responsibility 
together with the national energy agencies, which role is to actively promote the legal and 
institutional framework and conditions necessarily for developing the Nordic and European 
electricity market. This condition must be satisfied in a Northeast American-Canadian power 
exchange as well. We can imagine the role of Regie de l’energie to develop in this direction, 
together with for example parts of the U.S. Department of Energy.  
Today Québec has 17 interconnections with the neighboring areas. Recently a new 
interconnection to Ontario with a capacity of 1250 MW was taken in use. This line enables 
Hydro-Québec to export more power to Ontario and also use the neighboring province’s 
transmission system to export more energy to New York and the US Mid-West.  
MW Churchill New Brunswick Ontario New England New York Total 
Import mode 5150 770 1970 1970 1100 10960 
Export mode 0 1100 2545 2275 2125 8045 
 
Table 3.1 64 Interconnections 
The total interconnection capacity has the size of about one fifth of the total generation 
capacity in Québec. For a future integration of the wholesale markets this is a great start 
where the infrastructure base is already in place. Discussions are ongoing in regard of 
building a new transmission line to New Hampshire as well. This line is estimated to get the 
capacity of 1200 MW and will increase Québec’s ability to export electricity. The situation in 
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Norway is quite similar. Norway holds a transmission capacity of around 5500 MW to its 
neighboring countries and it is sufficient to create an integrated market. Considering that 
Norway’s maximum producing capacity is around 25,000 MW we see that the underlying 
conditions are quite the same. Norway also works on improving transmission capacities as it 
believes investments in the grid will lead to a greater economic rent and better exploration 
of the resources. 
The transmission grid in the USA is in private possession. This makes it very hard to get an 
overview of capacities and would complicate the process of creating an integrated market. 
The way grid capacity is purchased in the USA is a constrictor for this market design. In the 
Nordic market the transmission capacity is done by implicit auctioning where the capacity 
allowances is included in the auctions of electricity in the market. This automatically makes 
electricity flow from surplus areas with a low price to areas with a demand and higher prices. 
Unless a bottleneck occurs, this system leads to one unique system price. The system in USA 
is based on explicit auctioning. This means that transmission capacity is auctioned separately 
from the electricity. Since these two goods now are traded separately, non-transparency of 
information can lead to inefficient usage of the transmission grid and hence efficiency losses. 
An example of this poor market design is that the electricity was flowing from high price to 
low price areas in the connection between Western Denmark and Germany 24 percent of 
the time in 2006 due to explicit auctioning65. Investigating the U.S. transmission grid closer is 
out of scope for this thesis. Information is very hard to access. We can only assume that 
transmission operators are interested in making profits and that an integrated market would 
solve the transparency problem efficiently with or without regulatory help. As an insight, 
Wangensteens book claims that the transmission grid is a natural monopoly and it should be 
operated by a single transmission system operator under regulatory surveillance to reach 
economic efficiency. This is due to the physical characteristics of the grid. It is crucial for an 
integrated wholesale market that no owners of the transmission grid are able to deny access 
to the transmission grid from competitive generators. 
As argued for when discussing the Nordic restructuring, a complete power pool has some 
criteria it must fulfill.  
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- An exchange must be organized to able trade in electricity. If the political will is 
there and they work against the technical barriers, there is no other barrier that 
should make this criterion impossible.  
- Derivatives for hedging must be available to allow participants to treat their risk 
willingness. This option should naturally follow an integrated exchange. 
- A market for short-term production capacity trade where supply and demand is 
balanced. Different transmission grid designs may create problems, but this is 
crucial for the exchange to work efficiently.  
The first two criterions will naturally be a part of an integrated power exchange in the north-
east corner. The TSO’s handles the third function and the TSO’s must allow all firms access 
where the market determines the price. If the U.S. grid is to be kept in private possession, a 
better market transparency must be encouraged. Norway and the Nordic market fulfill these 
criterions and should be seen as a benchmark of how the integrated market should be built 
in the northeastern part of America. The last two criterions listed in section 2.3; trade in 
emission derivatives and a market for investing in new capacity, will be discussed later in 
section 3.3 and 3.7. 
3.2 Price developments in an integrated market 
What price on electricity could we expect from an integrated wholesale market? This is one 
of the most interesting questions we need to ask ourselves when discussing the proposal of 
creating an integrated market. This price would determine how much Hydro-Québec could 
improve their financial performance. If there is no market power or bottlenecks in the 
transmission grid, we would experience one uniform spot price for the whole area, just as in 
the Nordic market. But as we have discussed, the same problems experienced with 
bottlenecks in the Nordic region arises in our north east USA/Canada case.  
The last three years electricity exports from Québec have increased rapidly. From being 
stable around 15 TWh per year, Hydro-Québec sold 23.4 TWh to exports the last year and is 
a very important contributor to Hydro-Québec’s net income. The numbers from 2009 shows 
that net exports totaled $1,258 million for 18.5 TWh, which gives a unit contribution of 
6.8¢/kWh. Less generating, procurement and transmission costs net exports gave a net 
income of $672 million in 2009.  
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Electricity sales outside Québec 
 
All export sales Québec production   
 
Revenue 
MCAD 
TWh 
Per 
unit 
CAD 
Net Export 
MCAD 
TWh 
Per 
unit 
CAD 
Net 
income 
MCAD 
2005 1464 15,3 0,096 830 6,7 0,124 n/a 
2006 1149 14,5 0,079 814 7,0 0,116 564 
2007 1483 17,5 0,085 1104 10,7 0,103 733 
2008 1897 21,1 0,090 1484 15,2 0,098 977 
2009 1495 23 0,065 1258 18,5 0,068 672 
Table 3.2 
66
 Electricity sales outside Québec 
The difference between revenue and net export numbers are due to correction being made 
from Hydro-Québec’s own imports, which the province either consumes itself or works as an 
intermediate. This is the case for electricity supplied form Churchill Falls, Labrador, which is 
northeast of Quebec.  We see a trend of higher sales and net income until 2008, but falling 
average prices per unit of the electricity coming from Québec’s own drawdown67. An 
explanation is that the more Hydro-Québec exports, the lower the average price of exported 
electricity will be, because it no longer sells power only during the very peak periods with 
the highest prices. If they continue to increase exports, we can assume this trend to continue 
towards the marginal production cost method that sets the price in the export market. The 
dramatic fall in price and from 9.8¢ in 2008 to 6.8¢ in 2009 is explained by the more difficult 
market conditions in 2009, compared to the booming years before. This naturally affected 
the net income considerably. Together with the financial crisis prices on fossil fuels fell and 
an economic downturn made demand in general smaller than the years before. But still, the 
importance of export is crucial for Hydro-Québec’s result and is shown in the figure collected 
from the 2009 annual report. 
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Figure 3.3 
68
 Net electricity sales and income 
Exports only counted for 10 percent of net sales volume, but counted for 30 percent of the 
Hydro-Québec Production division’s net income. For the whole Hydro-Québec group, this 
makes up 22 percent of the net income. To increase exports is already one of Hydro-Québec 
Production’s main business objectives for the future. In the 2009-2013 Strategic Plan, Hydro-
Québec pursues that exports to Ontario and New England/New York are to be expanded. 
Building new transmission lines and accessing the private lines in the U.S. are central for 
enabling this strategy.  
We have throughout this thesis said that the marginal opportunity cost of production should 
decide the price of electricity in an integrated market. For Québec it is therefore highly 
relevant to make an analysis of the production in New England, New York, Ontario and 
Pennsylvania.  The first figure below show how the most utilized production methods are 
distributed in New England alone and the second shows the relevant U.S. areas together 
with Ontario.  
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Figure 3.4a Production New England   Figure 3.4b 69 Total production 
As in most other electricity markets coal, natural gas and nuclear dominate the supply 
situation. Hydropower is used wherever available and the use of petroleum based plants 
cover a small amount of total production to fill demand in peak hours. For us, it is very 
interesting to see which production method that sets the market price in the area. This can 
theoretically give us an estimated spot price in a future integrated market.  To be able to 
calculate this price, we need to have knowledge of prices of fossil fuels and efficiency of 
generation methods. If we remember the merit load curve, it shows that production from 
natural gas is the marginal source of electricity. The curve in figure 1.4 is transferable to the 
market northeast in the U.S. today. For the last 15-20 years, natural gas has been the 
marginal source of electricity in the northeast. During these years, no new nuclear or coal 
facilities has been built in New England. This situation has developed since natural gas was 
cheap during the 1990’s and since natural gas is known as a relatively clean and efficient 
energy source compared to coal. The nuclear technology has its own environmental 
problems.  From figure 1.3 we identify two peaks in the price of natural gas during the 2000 
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decade. The price is now back on a medium level, and it is expected to stay fairly low due to 
new technology development of shale gas. 
In the following tables we have done estimates on the future electricity generation price 
from gas in the northeast of USA, based on price data from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration and efficiency levels are gathered from the U.S. National Petroleum Council. 
We chose to make three scenarios, which represents a low, medium and high price 
development of the input fuel. This approach will later also be taken for coal. These 
estimates are very useful, and will be the base for further calculations in this thesis.  
Gas Scenarios Northeast of USA Natural Gas Electric Power Price USD/mmBTU 
Gas USD per kWh Low 4 USD Medium 7 USD High 10 USD 
NGCC 52% efficiency 6500 BTU/kWh 0,026 0,046 0,065 
CT 34% efficiency 10000 BTU/kWh 0,040 0,070 0,100 
    *NGCC - Natural Gas Combined Cycle70 
   *CT - Combustion Turbine 
    
Table 3.3 71 Gas scenarios 
 
The scenarios fit well with the highs and lows of natural gas price seen the last 15 years. The 
price per mmBTU has varied from just above 2 USD to almost 10 USD per mmBTU. When 
discussing natural gas, we divide into conventional and unconventional gas types. 
Conventional gas as we know it primarily consists of methane. Conventional gas is fairly easy 
and economically profitable to extract. Unconventional gas is defined as gases that are 
expensive and hard to extract. New technologies influence these qualifications, and what is 
unprofitable today can be profitable tomorrow. The last couple of years the exploration of 
shale gas has experienced a rapid growth due to developments in the technology. The 
northeast of the U.S. is an area with especially large deposits and some of these reservoirs 
cost less or the same to explore as conventional natural gas. This supports our estimates and 
makes it reasonable to believe that access to gas for electricity generation will remain at the 
same level for the near future and dominate the power supply in the northeast of the U.S.  
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Coal prices used for electricity generation vary quite much from state to state and plant to 
plant. Some plants have old contracts, which enable them to buy coal very cheap. This can 
especially be seen in the mid-western states of USA, where cost can be as low as 1.50 
USD/mmBTU. In the northeast of USA where we have our focus, prices tend to be higher 
than the U.S. average. The reason for that is that more of the procurement happens on the 
spot market, where a market price applies. Coal production is more expensive on the east 
coast of USA, where coal is mainly produced from underground mines. This is naturally more 
expensive to extract than surface mines. High transportation costs from other supply areas, 
makes the price on the north-east cost easily as high as 3 to 4 USD/mmBTU. Much of New 
Jersey’s demand is actually based on imported coal, which raises the price and gives New 
Jersey some of the highest coal prices in USA. As for natural gas, we have chosen to make 
three scenarios with a low, medium and high price. The price levels are chosen on the basis 
of U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) historical data and outlook for the future.  
Coal Scenarios Northeast of USA Coal Electric Power Price USD/mmBTU 
Coal USD per kWh Low 2,5 USD Medium 3,5 USD High 4,5 USD 
High efficiency 44% - 7700 BTU/kWh 0,019 0,027 0,035 
Low efficiency 37% - 9275 BTU/kWh 0,023 0,032 0,042 
Table 3.4 72 Coal scenarios 
Recent numbers released from EIA support the numbers in the scenario analysis. Average 
cost of coal delivered for electricity generation in New England January 2010 was 3.32 
USD/mmBTU. This is up four percent from 3.19 January last year, while the same price for 
natural gas was 7.87 and 8.48 USD/mmBTU respectively73. The figure under shows us the 
average fuel cost price for the entire USA for 1997-2008. This also supports both our low and 
high price scenarios. Even though the low price has not been seen in over ten years and the 
high price represents the most recent peak that ended with the financial crisis, it shows that 
the numbers we have chosen describe the scenarios to their extreme points.  
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Figure 3.5 
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 Fuel cost 
The marginal cost prices correlate well with the wholesale prices on the NEPOOL which is the 
electricity exchange in the New England area. Below is the wholesale prices shown for the 
last decade.  
 
Figure 3.6 75 Wholesale prices 
We want to compare wholesale prices to the price on natural gas since it is the price setter. 
We therefore compare this chart to the graph showing developments in the price of natural 
gas delivered for electric generation in figure 1.3. We recognize that they seem to correlate 
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and follow the same trend. Figure 3.6 show that a rising trend in wholesale prices appeared 
the last decade, with 2005 as an exceptional year due to high fossil fuel prices.  Economic 
situation, falling demand, drop in fossil fuel prices and new technologies prices led to the 
drop in 2009.  On NEPOOL in January 2010 the average wholesale price was 6.60 USD cents 
per kWh76. As a comparison, the average cost of natural gas delivered for electricity 
generation was 7.87 USD USD/mmBTU, which gives a production cost of 5.12 cents at our 
NGCC plant.  This still fits well with our scenarios when we know that not all plants for the 
moment have an efficiency level as low as 6500BTU/kWh, combustion turbines with lower 
efficiency will be used during certain hours with peak demand and that wholesale prices in 
reality are somewhat higher than the absolute marginal cost.  
3.2.1 Theoretical wholesale prices 
If we compare the wholesale prices in New England the last five years to the price Hydro-
Québec receives for electricity sales outside Québec in table 3.2, we see that the price 
Hydro-Québec receives is somewhat higher. This can indicate that Hydro-Québec sells 
electricity in peak hours where the price is higher, as we anticipated in theory subsection 
1.4.8 where we discussed advantageous characteristics of hydropower production. But in 
the same table (3.2) we just saw that the more Hydro-Québec exports, the lower gets the 
average price received per kWh from their own production. For the simplicity for further 
calculations though, we assume that the price Hydro-Québec will receive in an integrated 
wholesale market, is similar to the average wholesale price. To compensate for this 
assumption, we have chosen to make the wholesale average price estimates somewhat 
higher, so we can better display Hydro-Québec’s income potential. We also assume that 
these wholesale prices are not including a price of CO2 allowances. We can do this because 
of the uncertainty of the estimates and the current small size of the RGGI allowance price, 
which will be elaborated as an own topic in the next section. The following table gives an 
estimation of how the wholesale price received by Hydro-Québec would look like under the 
three scenarios where natural gas is price setter.  
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Gas Scenarios Northeast of USA Natural Gas Electric Power Price USD/mmBTU 
Average Wholesale Prices  Low 4 USD Medium 7 USD High 10 USD 
USD per kWh 0,030 0,060 0,080 
 
Table 3.5 Average wholesale prices gas based 
As we have seen, many factors can influence average wholesale prices of electricity. One 
possibility behind the numbers we have reached above is that by high fossil fuel prices the 
economy is strong and creates a high demand for electricity. Hence more expensive 
production methods must be taken into use. The opposite is the case when demand is low 
and we can experience lower prices. This situation we have experienced the last two years.  
We need to assume theoretical wholesale prices for coal as well. The efficiency range 
between plants is smaller for coal. Since coal is a cheaper production method than natural 
gas, the least efficient coal plants should be turned off after all natural gas plants in low 
demand periods if we only look at the fossil fuel cost aspect. Therefore the least efficient 
plant should reflect the coal average wholesale price. But on the other side, since there is 
much focus on making the coal technology cleaner, we assume that wholesale prices on 
NEPOOL in the time to come would converge towards the most efficient technology. We 
therefore ended up with the following three scenarios for the average wholesale price, if 
coal was price setter. 
Coal scenarios Northeast of USA Coal Electric Power Price USD/mmBTU 
Average Wholesale Prices  Low 2,5 USD Medium 3,5 USD High 4,5 USD 
USD per kWh 0,020 0,029 0,038 
 
Table 3.6 Average wholesale prices coal based 
Many unclear factors have the ability to influence fossil fuel prices in the future. When 
determining the three scenarios we have chosen to base our prices on a relative short time 
frame. If we were about to predict the future 30-40 years ahead, uncertainty grows. We 
believe fossil fuel prices will increase together with its scarcity. Predictions from EIA estimate 
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the prices of coal and natural gas to rise in size of 30 to 50 percent within 2030 from 2010 
levels77. This will naturally have a significant impact on the electricity prices.  
We remember from 2.7.5 that in Norway, coal is the price setter around 60-70 % of the time. 
Based on the interconnection capacity, such numbers would also be reasonable to expect for 
natural gas from USA in Québec. This means that Hydro-Québec would offer lower prices in 
Québec 30 to 40 percent of the time, since supply of water is larger than the capacity in the 
transmission grid. But similar to Norway, when there is undersupply, transmission 
restrictions will sometimes lead a higher area price than the spot price in the market, due to 
the fact that the marginal opportunity cost is higher. Québec customers would need to pay 
the higher price during these times. Subsection 3.1.2 discussed how Hydro-Québec in such 
bottleneck periods could exercise market power, but also suggested a solution to the 
problem. The domestic market would maybe not be as competition oriented as in Norway, 
but this is the price to pay for keeping Hydro-Québec in its present form. For the previous 
and following calculations we will for simplicity assume that the excess price paid by Québec 
customers in undersupply periods equal the lower price paid in oversupply periods. By doing 
this, we can assume the same price in each scenario. Despite the uncertainty, we have 
created some suitable estimates that we believe adequately represent the situation for 
Hydro-Québec today.  
3.3 Revenues from an integrated market with emission trading schemes 
Today there is no trading scheme like the ETS in place in North-America. As one of few 
industrialized countries, USA has not yet accepted the Kyoto Protocol. For the moment there 
is doubt if a new climate deal will come in place for the period after 2012 when the Kyoto 
Protocol expires. Much responsibility lies on the participants attending the climate summit 
meeting in Mexico later this year. Uncertainty arises if USA this time will accept a 
prospective new protocol. USA is critical to emission cuts they would have to go through 
with, compared to other large nations and especially the world’s largest polluter China. But 
chances are that we will see a change in direction from the U.S. regarding their 
environmental politics. It seems as President Barack Obama is more concerned about 
climate challenge than his predecessors. In a speech Obama held when he was the President 
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Elect, he said that the U.S. would develop strong annual targets on emission reductions, in 
order to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and an additional 80 percent within 2050. 
In the same speech he supports a 15 billion USD per year investments in renewable energy 
technologies. This is supposed to reduce emissions coming from the second largest polluter, 
and boost the green industry in USA78. Last year the U.S. Congress established a bill that will 
make major electric suppliers raise its renewable energy share to at least 20 percent within 
2020. The bill is called the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 and can be seen 
as a cap and trade regulation. For the moment the act is only considering the electric 
industry, and is yet to be accepted by the Senate. A possible acceptance is positive for 
Hydro-Québec which sees a possible growth in both exports and market prices. This change 
in policy direction from the U.S., gives hope that a new climate deal also will include USA and 
create a market similar to the ETS where polluting industries must pay for their emissions in 
North-America as well. A global problem needs a global solution. 
Although a domestic initiative on emission allowances are not taken in the U.S., positive 
movements have been made in some regions. Québec is a partner in the Western Climate 
Initiative which mission is to reduce greenhouse gases. Western states of the U.S. and five 
Canadian provinces are participating. One effort is to introduce a cap and trade program. 
The program is still under construction and is not yet valid. For Québec as an electricity 
producer, it is more interesting to look to the east where they have interconnections for 
exporting electricity. The Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States have created something 
called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) which is the first mandatory and market 
based initiative in the U.S. to reduce greenhouse gases. The first compliance period is 2009-
2011. The RGGI covers fossil fuel fired power plants with a capacity of 25 MW or more, 
which in total affects about 225 facilities region-wide. Its main target is to reduce CO2 
emissions from the power industry by 10 percent from 2009 levels by 2018. This effort, 
together with an optimistic view of a new climate deal where the U.S. hopefully will 
participate, makes us believe that there can be economic benefits for Hydro-Québec in the 
same way as the ETS has led to higher energy prices in Europe. As we have seen earlier, this 
extra cost for the marginal producer of electricity which is based on fossil fuels, will increase 
the market price of electricity and make producers of hydroelectricity earn windfall profits.  
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Figure 3.7 
79
 Clearing prices RGGI 
Figure 3.7 shows the development in the RGGI CO2 allowance price. The price seems to 
stabilize on a price of as low as 2 USD/Short Ton, which turned into EUR and metric tons 
means a price of 1.65 EUR/Ton. This is only about 1/10 of the prices experienced in the EU 
and ETS today. We need to ask ourselves why the difference is that large. One major reason 
is that the reduction demand is only 10 percent of 2009 levels compared to 20 percent of 
1990 levels in the ETS program. The marginal cost of emission reductions is much cheaper in 
the first parts of the marginal cost of abatement curve as seen in figure 1.9 due to the 
exponential shape of the curve. Offsets are also possible to a certain extend in the RGGI 
market, which means power producers can reduce their emissions in other sectors than the 
power industry. This helps keeping the MCA curve low at the beginning. It is reasonable to 
claim that too many allowances have been released on the market and the abatement cost 
of emission reductions seems to have been overestimated. We may see some price volatility 
in the end of the first period in 2011, due to the continuously quota auctions. But RGGI 
learned from the largest ETS mistake, and allowed banking of allowances to future periods. 
This will reduce price volatility and avoid bottom prices. Another reason is that much of the 
electricity production in the New England area now comes from natural gas plants. Since 
coal emits more CO2 than gas per kWh, reductions can be made when shifting production 
method from coal to natural gas. We have seen in New England during the last 15-20 years 
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that coal plants have been replaced by natural gas plants. Natural gas has been a preferred 
method as it demands a low capital cost, has a short approval and construction period and 
has high energy efficiency with the modern technology. New natural gas plants have 
emissions about 35 percent lower than a traditional natural gas plant with a combustion 
turbine. Nuclear generation has not been popular since some incidents in the 1970’s and 
80’s. These factors together with the economic downtimes experienced since 2008 makes 
the RGGI CO2 allowance price that low. Since demand has lowered, the need for allowances 
has decreased as well.  
With the price of CO2 allowances in New England today, the cap and trade program would 
not lead to substantial income for a hydroelectricity generator, the impact on the electricity 
price will be marginal. But there are reasons to believe that the price of CO2 allowances will 
increase in the time to come.  If USA shall reach future climate goals, a well functioning 
carbon market is an absolute necessity. Point Carbon, an environment analyst company, 
estimates that a nationwide cap and trade program will result in a carbon price of around 13 
USD/Ton in 2012 with an increase to 16.50 USD in 2020 as a result of fewer allowances 
available in the market80. McKinsey assumes a somewhat higher price of 16 Euro/Ton in the 
U.S. and explains the price difference with the EU as different offset policies81. If the 
criterions from the suggested American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 are accepted 
we will see this scenario, but offset regulations will be somewhat less strict than what the 
ETS must fulfill. The price is therefore anticipated to be a bit lower than in the EU.  
Since we want to estimate the future revenue potential from CO2 allowances for Hydro-
Québec, we find it natural to follow the same approach as before by making three scenarios 
for the price of CO2 emissions. We base our estimates on the knowledge we have from RGGI 
and ETS prices today together with the future estimates we have seen above.  
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CO2 Allowances Scenarios Low Price USD Medium Price USD High Price USD 
USD per metric Ton 2,00 15,00 40,00 
 
Table 3.7 CO2 allowances prices 
Behind these estimates there are several assumptions. In the lower price, business as usual 
is assumed and prices are the same as in the RGGI program today. If the Clean Energy and 
Security Act is accepted, it is reasonable to believe that a price of 15 USD can occur 
immediately. The Act suggests a minimum price of 10 USD and combined with analysis 
shown above, we assume 15 USD to be a good medium price estimate.  A price of 40 USD in 
the high price scenario is based on expectations of the ETS prices in the future together with 
historical prices seen in the ETS. The scenarios may be inexact, but they will be able to give 
us an understanding of how Hydro-Québec may benefit from CO2 quota prices in the time to 
come. We therefore need to calculate how much the price of emission allowances will 
influence the price per kWh.  
Step one is to find out how much CO2 is emitted per kWh for each production method. A 
study from the US Department of Energy from 1999 states that the New England average is 
879 gram CO2/kWh for coal and 551 gram CO2/kWh for natural gas82. During the last ten 
years much focus has been directed to lower these limits. Recent numbers from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and EIA makes us believe that these location specific 
numbers are lower today83. On basis of these three studies we have created estimates 
where we assume emissions to be 375 gram CO2/kWh for natural gas and 800 gram 
CO2/kWh for coal. We now interpret these results in the previous table.  
CO2 Allowances Scenarios Low Price USD Medium Price USD High Price USD 
USD per metric Ton 2,00 15,00 40,00 
CO2 tax/kWh Coal  0,00160 0,01200 0,03200 
CO2 tax/kWh Gas 0,00075 0,00563 0,01500 
Table 3.8 CO2 allowance scenarios 
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What does this table show us? Most importantly it shows that a low allowance price will 
hardly affect the electricity price at all. It also shows that the price increase of producing coal 
will be more expensive relatively to producing from natural gas. Since natural gas is price 
setter in the northeastern part of USA today, it is therefore interesting to research whether 
coal ever will turn out to be a more expensive production method.  
For the following figures, we base our calculation on the average wholesale prices. Some 
may argue that it would be better to focus on the natural gas and coal scenario prices, which 
are somewhat lower and tells us the marginal cost of generation. But in an integrated 
wholesale market, the wholesale price is the one interesting for a market participant. The 
wholesale represents better the price Hydro-Québec can expect on a power exchange. If we 
compare the last year’s wholesale prices to the average export price received by Hydro-
Québec, it confirms our reasoning. The following figures present the low, medium and high 
average wholesale price scenarios with four different scenarios for the CO2 allowance price. 
This gives us average wholesale prices including the price of CO2 allowances. The figures 
assume that the fossil fuel scenario is the same for both natural gas and coal in each 
scenario. 
Figure 3.8 Low medium and high average wholesale prices with four CO2 scenarios. 
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As we see from these figures, natural gas will still be the price setter in almost all scenarios. 
Coal will only take over as a price setter with low fossil fuel and high CO2 allowance prices. 
The price of natural gas is too high relative to coal, for coal to be a more expensive 
generation method. These figures do not include the fact that price levels of coal and natural 
gas may be different. A medium price of coal and low price of natural gas could easily occur, 
and coal would then be price setter in the market at medium and high CO2 quota prices. It 
would be too comprehensive to make figures of all scenarios, but all scenarios are 
summarized in the following table.   
Average Wholesale Prices 
with CO2 Allowance 
Scenarios USD per kWh 
Fossil fuel prices 
Low Medium High 
Coal Gas Coal Gas Coal Gas 
CO2 
allowance 
price 
No CO2 price 0,0200 0,0300 0,0290 0,0600 0,0380 0,0800 
Low  0,0216 0,0308 0,0306 0,0608 0,0396 0,0808 
Medium 0,0320 0,0356 0,0410 0,0656 0,0500 0,0856 
High 0,0520 0,0450 0,0610 0,0750 0,0700 0,0950 
 
Table 3.9 Average wholesale prices with CO2 allowance scenarios 
If a medium or high price on both CO2 allowances and fossil fuel occurs, the situation for 
Hydro-Québec will turn very favorable. The table shows how much the average wholesale 
price inclusive CO2 allowance per kWh will be in each scenario. Since the most expensive 
electricity offered decides the market price, hydropower will sell their supply at the same 
price and producers will experience windfall profits. We have seen in earlier sections that 
the end consumers in an open market are the ones ending up with the bill for the increased 
prices due to the introduction of CO2 allowances. Hydro-Québec would therefore earn more 
on export sales, and the surplus redistribution from domestic customers would become even 
larger if Québec abandoned the Heritage Pool policy. Since Hydro-Québec is owned by the 
provincial government, this can be turned into something positive for the inhabitants of 
Québec. The extra income surplus redistribution will namely be redistributed to the province 
either as dividends or company taxes.  
3.4 Energy efficiency 
Higher prices in the province of Québec would mean higher revenues for Hydro-Québec. The 
surplus would be transferred from the customer to Hydro-Québec and its owner, the 
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province of Québec. This would be a change in consumer to producer surplus. Regarding 
energy efficiency, the yellow triangle in figure 1.5 represents the welfare loss due to today’s 
market design. It is very hard to determine what a change in the price from being regulated 
to being decided from a market, would have to say on the consumption of electricity in 
Québec. In subsection 1.4.3 we saw some numbers from studies that have been done. These 
studies vary significantly, and the results are only valid within a certain range. If we assume 
that electricity prices would double, these numbers would make less sense. Elasticities are 
only valid for smaller intervals where they can be considered as linear. When changes in 
price are as large as the one experienced in our case, we can no longer assume that demand 
will follow a linear curve. In a discussion with Professor Jean-Thomas Bernard, we discussed 
different scenarios regarding energy efficiency in Québec84. We choose to base our 
upcoming efficiency scenarios on this knowledge, together with knowledge from the 
elasticity studies.  
Hydro-Québec is central in the province’s work to reduce energy consumption and improve 
energy efficiency. The Hydro-Québec incentives should have been highlighted well in this 
thesis. For residential consumers a row of measures are taken to reduce electricity 
consumption. We can recognize several efforts also being present in Norway. The focus lies 
on making residential customers aware of their energy use and get them to consume energy 
wisely in their homes. Campaigns for investing in new refrigerators, efficient lighting bulbs, 
swimming pool timers and energy efficient windows and doors are extracts from efforts 
taken. Supporting subventions are offered to new houses installing geothermal energy. For 
business customers other measures apply, as for example programs for building 
optimization and improvement of industrial systems. In total Hydro-Québec has a goal of 
reaching 11 TWh in improved energy efficiency by 2015. This is our efficiency scenario 
number one, which we call business as usual.  
Scenario number two takes into account measures suggested throughout this thesis. An 
integrated market for electricity is able to be established in the region and the price for 
electricity will increase as it is decided by the market. In this scenario though, only 
residential households plus small and medium businesses are affected. The power intensive 
industry is not included. Around 100 TWh per year will be affected by a price increase. The 
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government still controls prices offered to large power users in the industry. The paper & 
pulp together with the large aluminum industry represents the large power classification. 
We call this scenario the regulated restructuring. 
The third and last scenario is the total restructuring scenario. In this scenario all market 
participants must pay the market price for the electricity demanded. What separates this 
scenario from scenario number two is that around 60 TWh of power intensive industry is 
affected. Around 270 Hydro-Québec customers fall into this classification. The aluminum 
industry in Québec demands around 50 TWh yearly. Together with the paper and pulp 
industry we make an estimate that around 60 TWh belongs to industries that are heavily 
subsidized by the provincial government. This is approximately one third of the Québec’s 
electricity demand. Table 1.5 showed that these actors today pay a flat rate of 2.99 cents per 
kWh for the energy consumed. If we hold the additional power capacity charges outside, 
which also covers transmission and distribution charge for this customer group, the price per 
kWh is just above the heritage pool price of 2.79 cents. The low electricity prices for this 
customer group have been an intentional choice by the politicians in Québec to attract these 
industries and secure jobs for the people. The politicians saw a possibility to take advantage 
of the hydro resources. Bernard is one of the most known critics against this policy. Since 
new power plants now are so costly to exploit, a price based on average cost of production 
leads to the fact that new development of supply sources are heavily subsidized by the 
government. Bernard and Belanger estimate that a position at a new developed aluminum 
plant is supported by an indirect subsidy in the range of 255,351 and 729,653 dollars per 
permanent job per year85. Their calculations say that Québec would be much better off 
exporting the electricity at market price than selling it cheap to energy intensive industry. 
Our assumption in the total restructuring scenario of a single market price for the whole 
energy intensive industry in Québec may not be very likely for the moment. The industries 
have a traditional strong position within the province, and the labor unions have a strong 
political influence. Facilitating for industry is an important part of the province’s district 
population policy. A more reasonable assumption could be that electricity prices for heavy 
users could be rising together with the amount demanded. For example the first 30 TWh 
could be cheap and then the price could be increasing. But allocation problems would then 
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arise. Who gets the first 30 TWh? Is it equally divided? Will the existing participants get 
access to this pool first? This will lead to entry problems for new plants and a distortion of 
competition. To avoid these complicated issues and to be able to show the case to its 
extreme, we choose to assume that all market participants must pay the market price in our 
third scenario.  
3.5 Income calculations  
We have so far in this thesis made scenarios of both future fossil fuel prices and CO2 
scenarios. These were merged into average wholesale prices with CO2 allowances scenarios 
in table 3.9. We will choose three out of these scenarios for further use in the calculations of 
possible revenues for Hydro-Québec and the province. These scenarios should represent a 
low income, medium income and high income possibility for Hydro-Québec. This will 
represent a broad and relevant analysis of our scenarios. We assume that electricity 
consumption saved in Québec can be exported to the U.S. at market price. 
 The first scenario chosen is average wholesale prices and a low price on CO2 
allowances. CO2 prices in the RGGI are at this level today and low average wholesale 
prices have been seen and can occur again. The expected average wholesale price 
inclusive CO2 allowances will therefore be as low as 3.08 cents/kWh.  
 The second marginal cost scenario is maybe the most likely to happen in the time to 
come. This scenario expects a medium allowance and wholesale price, which means 
a wholesale price inclusive CO2 quota of 6.56 cents/kWh.  
 To show the extreme case, a high price on both variables is chosen in the third 
scenario. As of now, a high CO2 price may seem unlikely, but it shows an interesting 
result. High wholesale prices have been seen recently, and can easily happen in the 
future. Price is as high as 9.50 cents/kWh.  
In contrary to oil deposits, hydro power resources are infinite. It is a part of the natural 
circular movement and will create income for Québec continuously. The NPV rows therefore 
represent the value of the water and hydro dam assets. We assume a required return of 7.5 
percent. The inflation rate is set at 2 percent on the basis of Canadian inflation numbers 
from the last 20 years. 
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Scenario business as usual is quite easy to calculate. The efficiency gains from efforts to 
reduce domestic demand can be assumed exported to higher prices.  
Please note that the numbers in square brackets are in cents. Ex. (3.08 cents - 2.79 cents). 
1) Business as usual Low Medium High 
Efficiency Calculations 11 TWh x (3,08-2,79) 11 Twh x (6,56-2,79) 11 TWh x (9,50-2,79) 
Result $ 31,9 Million/year $ 414,7 Million/year $ 738,1 Million/year 
NPV $ 0,58 Billion $ 7,54 Billion $ 13,42 Billion 
Table 3.10 1) Business as usual 
Even a relatively small effort to reduce domestic consumption can have large consequences. 
Depending on the market price, Québec can estimate new income from exports in the range 
of 31.9 million to as much as 738 million per year. Remembering that 2009 exports were 23 
TWh and it brought in 1.495 Million that counted for as much as 22 % of the net income for 
the Hydro-Québec group, we clearly see the business improvement potential if fossil fuel 
prices stay on a decent level. 
Scenario regulated restructuring builds on the first scenario and includes the 11 TWh Hydro-
Québec efficiency efforts, but now residential customers will have to pay market price on 
their electricity consumption. A price increase will naturally lead to less demand, and the 
reductions in domestic electricity use can be exported. Bernard estimates the long term 
elasticity to be around -0.4 to -0.5, but believes this number can be underestimated86. Some 
of the estimates from section 1.4.3 are also in this interval. We claim that as long as the 
electricity is cheaper or the same price as the closest substitute, natural gas for residential 
use, we will see small amounts of energy type substitution. A substitution will demand costly 
investments in equipment. Since fuel prices are the same or most probably higher for private 
actors than large electric utilities, it will not be profitable. Reduction in demand will 
therefore come from energy efficiency and savings alone. Just as for marginal abatement 
cost of emissions, the first energy reductions will be the easiest ones to make. Before looking 
into scenario 2, we therefore need to estimate some reductions of consumption based on 
our low, medium and high wholesale price scenarios.  
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We saw in subsection 1.5.1 that the average price by households and farmers was 6.2 
cents/kWh. If we assume that the same average transmission and distribution cost of about 
3.4 cents (6.2 minus 2.79 cents from the Heritage Pool) applies, we can use elasticity 
estimates to find out the reductions. We assume that these costs will stay the same and 
occur in every case for all sectors. This may be a rough assumption, especially for medium 
business customers. But because of the overall relative large elasticity uncertainty, we 
assume an elasticity of -0.4 for all 100 TWh to ease our calculations. 
Consumption 
reductions  
New end-consumer price Price 
increase 
Elasticity 
assumption 
Reduction 
 
Adjustment 
 Low 6.20+(3.08-2.79) = 6,49 5 % 0,4 2 % → 2 % 
Medium 6.20+(6.56-2.79) = 9,97 61 % 0,4 24 % → 20 % 
High 6.20+(9.50-2.79) = 12,91 108 % 0,4 43 % → 35 % 
Table 3.11 Consumption reductions 
We choose to adjust the reduction to somewhat lower levels in the medium and high case as 
we believe the reductions will be harder and more costly to accomplish. The numbers are 
used to see whether a transformation of consumer to producer surplus or efficiency 
improvement finds place. We implement our adjusted reduction numbers in our energy 
efficiency scenarios. 
2) Regulated restructuring Low Medium High 
Efficiency Calculations 100 TWh x 2% 100 TWh x 20% 100 Twh x 35% 
Export Sales Cal. 2 TWh x (3,08-2,79) 20 TWh x (6,56-2,79) 35 TWh x (9,50-2,79) 
Domestic Sales Cal. 98 TWh x (3,08-2,79) 80 TWh x (6,56-2,79) 65 TWh x (9,50-2,79) 
Result Export $ 5,8 Million $ 754 Million $ 2348,5 Million 
Result Domestic $ 284,2 Million $ 3 016 Million $ 4361,5 Million 
From 1) $ 31,9 Million $ 414,7 Million $ 738,1 Million 
Total $ 321,1 Million/year $ 4184,7 Million/year $ 7448,1 Million/year 
NPV $ 5,8 Billion $ 76,1 Billion $ 135,4 Billion  
Table 3.12 2) Regulated restructuring 
The energy reduction in Québec is exported to the U.S. and represents the efficiency 
improvement. The Result Domestic represents the change from consumer to producer 
surplus. The surplus has clearly gone from the people to the government.  Since Hydro-
Québec is owned by the province, this will benefit the inhabitants of Québec. The lowest 
price scenario will barely have any impact, but we recognize that the numbers are significant 
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for the medium and high wholesale price scenarios. We believe our most likely scenario for 
the future is somewhere in excess of the medium scenario. This makes a net present value of 
approximately 75-85 billion dollars for the regulated restructuring. If we add this amount 
with the net income around 3 billion per year that Hydro-Québec generates today, we get a 
market value of the company around 130-140 billion. This correlates well with other 
estimates that have been made87. 
Total restructuring will lead to the most radical changes. With this market design, the energy 
intensive industries in Québec would lose their competitive advantage with medium or high 
average wholesale prices. They would then probably find other locations to produce their 
goods. The following calculations do not include the economic contribution the industries 
create in Québec. A complete research would include contributions as for example, company 
and employee taxes, the industries business with other Québec companies and the general 
economic activity the industries create in their area. Alcoa only, a large aluminum company 
which has 3600 employees and nine aluminum plants in Québec, estimates their total 
economic generation in Québec to be around 1.5 Billion per year88. Unfortunately, a 
complete research is out of scope for this thesis. We are satisfied with showing the value of 
Hydro-Québec’s hydropower assets. But we keep in mind that Bernard and Belanger states 
that every new job in the aluminum industry is heavily subsidized. The solution is probably 
somewhere in between.    
Large industrial users pay 2.99 cents for their electricity. Only 20 cents of the price is 
supposed to cover transmission and distribution cost. The additional is covered by the power 
cost. It is therefore relevant to make three average wholesale scenarios with the Heritage 
Pool price also in this scenario.  
3) Total restructuring Low Medium High 
Efficiency Calculations 60 TWh x (3,08-2,79) 60 TWh x (6,56-2,79) 60 TWh x (9,50-2,79) 
Result $ 174 Million $ 2262 Million $ 4026 Million 
From 1) and 2) $ 321,9 Million $ 4184,7 Million $ 7448,1 Million 
Total $ 495,9 Million/year $ 6446,7 Million/year $ 11474,1 Million/year 
NPV $ 9,0 Billion $ 117,2 Billion $ 208,6 Billion 
Table 3.13 3) Total restructuring 
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This table illustrates the most extreme scenario of them all. With high fossil fuel and CO2 
quota prices, the electricity sales will bring in an additional 11.4 billion per year. We do not 
believe this is a very realistic scenario in the near future, and we do neither necessarily 
support efforts that will make the energy intensive industry leave the province. But we 
believe sound price setting can help secure future energy supply and trigger energy 
efficiency for both residential and industrial users. How price sensitive the consumers will be 
also depends greatly on the general economic development of Québec. As we have seen in 
the case Norway, even though wholesale prices have more than doubled, consumption has 
increased since the restructuring, thanks to a strong growth in the national economy over 
the last 20 years. To what extend the plan of electrification of the transportation sector to 
save on emissions will succeeds, will certainly affect the future domestic demand in Québec. 
We believe a market price would better reflect such variables, and therefore lead to a more 
dynamic market for electricity.  
The calculations above have their limitations. Many assumptions are made for us to reach 
the numbers above. Changes in these assumptions can lead to different outcomes. For 
example, our calculations do not include the cost of expanding the transmission grid. This 
should have been included when investigating the profitability of the project. A 1250 MW 
interconnection can easily amount 500 million. The unavailable transmission grid 
information in the U.S. makes it a tough assignment. We have chosen to exclude such 
calculations due to the complexity and inaccuracy it would lead to. Large cost must be 
expected when implementing the whole restructuring process. Power charges should 
possibly also have been taken height for in the calculations, but lack of data access makes 
this difficult. Although this analysis has its weaknesses, we believe it highlights the situation 
well by showing different possible revenue scenarios for Hydro-Québec. The exact numbers 
are not the most important, but to make an understanding of the future possibilities for the 
Québec electricity market.  
3.6 Allocation of rent 
If a restructuring found place, the big political issue in Québec would be how to allocate the 
new income from higher electricity prices. In a society where low electricity prices are 
preferred to a market price with following tax reductions, that actually could make 
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inhabitants better off is declined, finding a rule of allocation is extremely challenging. The 
efficiency improvement can in theory make all participants better off. Such a rule is of course 
not likely to be found, but a rule that makes the majority of voters better off should be 
targeted. What creates the most resistance against higher electricity prices is the argument 
that it would lead to an unfair social cost. The low income groups would be more affected 
than high income groups. Since electricity among many is seen as a basic, human right in 
Québec, redistribution must preferably ensure that low income groups are not worse off. 
Several redistribution policies have been launched regarding redistribution. To use the new 
profits on public expenses as health, infrastructure and education is a good option. Some 
suggest paying out dividends from Hydro-Québec directly to the inhabitants of Québec and 
some even an extreme version where Hydro-Québec is divested and the ownership given to 
the inhabitants. As stated, tax reductions seem not to be a preferred option.  We believe 
Québec can see to Norway also to solve this issue. In the same way as hydropower is a 
natural fortune in both Québec and Norway, Norway also has very large amounts of offshore 
oil and gas. Through the last 40 years, this has created an enormous income for the 
government. In 1990 a governmental sovereign fund was established to administer the 
fortune. Its target is to keep or increase the value of the original oil fortune as it is 
transferred to monetary values. The whole idea is that future generations shall enjoy the 
fortune just as much as the generations today, while the yearly profits can be used in the 
state budget. In 2006 Québec established a Generations Fund to pay down the public debt of 
Québec. The idea is similar, future generations should not have to pay for today’s fun. We 
support this idea, and believe this is an acceptable way to manage income from higher 
electricity prices. Professor Alban D’Amours, former deputy minister of revenue and energy, 
and president of the public debate panel on energy ahead of the creation of Regie de 
l’energie in 1997, support these thoughts and states that larger income from higher prices 
should be invested in a long term plan that will benefit future generations89. Even though 
renewable water and fossil fuel resources may not be the best direct comparison, the case 
of the sovereign fund shows that people are willing to make a sacrifice when their children 
and future generations are affected. This can be the solution to make Québecers accept a 
higher price for their electricity.  
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3.7 Financing new capacity in renewable energy for the future 
We have now seen how profitable the current electricity capacity can be for the province of 
Québec. So before ending this thesis, we will explain some of the new trends that exist for 
creating new capacity in markets today. This capacity can then be used to cover future 
growth in domestic demand or to be exported. With the low rates experienced today, we 
have seen that the provincial government must subsidize new generating facilities. The 
hydropower sites that were easiest to build were utilized first and Bernard estimates the 
cost of new hydropower facilities in Québec to be in the range of 10¢/kWh90. The cost of 
generating is increasing and the price of electricity should reflect this change. This is what we 
have argued for throughout this thesis, by saying that electricity prices should reflect the 
marginal opportunity cost. If the market would decide, the new capacity would be from 
fossil fuel plants. This is the case since new large scale hydropower sites are expensive to 
build and wind and solar also demands relative large investments costs per kWh. But since 
governments wants to increase the percentage of renewable energy they are now 
supporting renewable energy projects with financial funds.  Instead of subsidizing these 
projects there is a new instrument in the industry that can be used. This instrument will 
make the market pay and cover the costs for the higher investments cost of renewable 
energy. Some governments have already taken this instrument in practice. If we remember 
back to section 2.3, we saw that a market for investments in new production capacities was 
missing in the restructured Norwegian market. As of today, the Norwegian government is 
working on a green certificate policy that has been present in Sweden for some time. Green 
certificates are supposed to encourage investments in clean and renewable energy. Sweden 
has a target of increasing their production capacity with as much as 17 TWh within 2016 
with the help of this policy. New producers of renewable energy are given these green 
certificates equal to the amount of energy they produce. Governments can then create a 
regulatory policy which forces distributors of electricity to buy a certain percentage from 
these suppliers. This will create a price of the limited certificates that the producers hold, 
and help finance the renewable energy that has a higher long run marginal cost than fossil 
fuel production. In a functioning wholesale market this would be easy to implement by 
imposing distributors to buy a certain percent from holders of green certificates. From the 
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commercial and industrial sector we could also assume that a volunteer, individual demand 
for green certificates could arise. It would be an excellent opportunity for a company to 
show corporate social responsibility by supporting the green, renewable industry. Deutsche 
Bahn, the German railway company, is a good example of this. On their website they 
promote that they offer a CO2 free transportation method as they buy their electricity from 
green sources91. For Québec we believe such green certificates could help the province 
finance small run-of-river hydro plants, geo-thermal heating, solar and windmill projects. 
Today the Hydro- Québec mostly agrees long term contracts with small individual producers 
of electricity through the tender calls process. Instead a subvention of these projects, they 
should let the market finance these projects by purchasing green certificates. For the 
development of large hydro sites it is more questionable if green certificates can be used to 
finance new capacity. There are discussions if large dams are to be considered as 
environmental friendly due to the impact on the natural river flow. No matter the outcome 
of these discussions, the development of wind and solar energy in Québec has a great 
development potential and could take advantage of this policy.  
In theory green certificates would work as the CO2 quotas we have discussed in detail 
earlier. The government sets a cap of how much development that is desired and the 
certificate price is decided in the market. Alternatively, feed-in tariffs can be used to 
stimulate renewable production. Especially in Germany this has been a popular measure. 
Private persons are inspired to invest in small producing units as solar panels on their roofs. 
If they have surplus in production, this surplus is fed into the grid and the government pays a 
price for this electricity. In this case, the government decides the price, while the market 
decides the quantity. As the green certificates were comparable to cap and trade, feed-in 
tariffs are equal to a taxing policy. These possible efforts and future developments are 
closely linked to an introduction of smart readers which dynamically measures the energy 
consumption. For the moment smart readers are considered to be too expensive for the 
Québec market. Figure 3.9 shows how the electricity price would be influenced by green 
certificates. The price would be higher and as a consequence more sound capacity could be 
developed. 
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Figure 3.9 Price with CO2 and green certificate 
As a matter of fact, the income from CO2 allowances can also be used for investing in green 
renewable technologies. The RGGI uses the income from CO2 allowances mainly for two 
purposes. The first is to reduce CO2 emissions and the second is to support a green economy 
by investing in energy efficiency and renewable energy. We believe that a green certificate 
policy is useful and would help developing the future capacity needs, secure future 
electricity supply and decreasing the dependency on fossil fuel in electricity generation. This 
will also be of current interest for Québec as the province is using more and more of its 
capacity itself and development needs in new capacity both for domestic usage and exports 
are present. Green certificates would enable other producers than Hydro-Québec to access 
the Québec generation market, with the government still having control over a sound 
environmental development of electric generation, by setting the criterions for certificate 
allocation. It could also stimulate the development of a new industry where a green and 
renewable industry is in focus, which would contribute to the Québec economy. When fully 
developed, we could even experience that the new capacity will lead to a price decrease, as 
more capacity is available in the market. This depends on how strong the future demand 
growth will be compared to the capacity offered. We have not had a greater focus on green 
certificates in this thesis, as we believe the initial problem of the heritage pool must be 
overcome before this measure could be relevant. But it is indeed an interesting topic for a 
future research project. 
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3.8 Problems 
In this thesis we have mostly argued for the positive aspects of an integrated market for 
electricity. We have seen that the price for the end-consumers will increase and they will 
believe this is negative. But for the economy as a whole, a restructuring is efficient. It is a 
question of resource allocation if end-consumers will benefit from a restructuring or not. But 
is it really so that a market price is the perfect solution? C.-K. Woo, Lloyd and Tischler have 
looked into the restructurings in Alberta, California, Norway and the UK92. The case of 
Norway is considered as a reform success and we have therefore argued for the 
implementation of a Norwegian market model for a restructuring in Québec. But they also 
find some negative aspects about the Norwegian restructuring.  
The main problem working against the ideas of this thesis are is the limitations in the 
transmission grid. Throughout this thesis, restrictions in the transmission grid have been 
seen as a treat to a common market price, and they also see this as one negative aspect of 
the Norwegian reform. Québec has fairly good interconnections with its neighbor areas, but 
a single generator in Québec would probably still lead to market power. We are 
remembering that in Norway there are many generators offering their supply. Limitations in 
the U.S. transmission grid are also problematic. Expanding the grid in the New England and 
New York area is very expensive. Around the large cities there is no free land for new grids. 
This is why New York and Boston experiences the highest residential electricity prices around 
25 cents/kWh, even though other cities within the same state pay a much lower price. A 
better grid will improve efficiency, but the governments need to keep in mind that there is 
also a limit of how economical efficient a grid update can be. To make an estimation of how 
much would have to be invested in the grid to make a unified system price is a very hard 
assignment. It is behind the scope of this thesis, but definitely an interesting problem of 
discussion and it should be an interesting topic for further research. In this thesis we have 
assumed that the limitations transmission grid would not make an integrated market 
impossible, and we have found our motivation for this assumption by looking to the Nordic 
market.  
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Woo, Lloyd and Tischler also state that the investment level in new capacity has gone down. 
We find this natural since Norway had excess capacity before the restructuring, as the case is 
for Québec today. When prices increase to marginal cost of new generation, we will see 
expansion in the generation capacity in a market where supply and demand decides the 
price. Green certificates and CO2 allowances can stimulate green and renewable generation 
and the overall capacity. This can also help to ease market entry by other generators, which 
is a problem in regions with hydro based production due to scarcity of rivers. Small scale 
hydro, windmill, bio-fuels and solar energy are therefore methods of current interest. In 
general, Woo, Lloyd and Tischler are supporters of the Norwegian market design and 
consider the many participants on the supply and demand side as positive. This is hard to 
achieve in Québec, an integrated market in the northeast of the continent is therefore a 
suggested solution to this problem. For the three other restructured markets, they identify 
more market failures. Some major critics are the facts that there are too few buyers and 
sellers in the market, too high price volatility and the market transparency is too small. As a 
consequence, availability and efficiency of hedging instruments are not the same as at Nord 
Pool. The hydropower from Québec can stabilize the market price, so less volatility occurs 
and the market becomes more predictable. We therefore suggest Québec and the other 
participating states and provinces to adopt the design of Nord Pool which we have thorough 
presented in this thesis.  
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4.0 Concluding remarks 
4.1 Outlook for the future 
Since we started the work on this thesis, some movement has happened in terms of raising 
the electricity price in Québec. In the end of March the Québec government announced 
their provincial budget, where the raise of the Heritage Pool price starting in 2014 was the 
most controversial change.  The finance minister announced that the Heritage Pool price 
would increase with one cent per kWh within 2018 from 2.79 to 3.79 cents/kWh93. Low 
income groups will be protected through a special solidarity tax. The income from this effort 
is actually meant to be placed in the Generations Fund to help pay down Québec’s public 
debt. The gross debt is currently around 150 billion dollars. It seems as politicians are slowly 
realizing that new sources of electricity supply are costly. This eventually had to lead to an 
upward pressure on the prices, as argued for in this thesis. For the time being there are no 
immediate plans to fully integrate the electricity markets in northeast USA and east Canada. 
The general economic situation in the world is a negative driver of a restructuring. If the 
world economy is able to recover and the extensive climate goals are about to reached, the 
possibility of a restructuring in the future may still have a chance.      
4.2 Conclusion 
Due to the characteristics of the Norwegian electricity market, it may not be that easy to 
implement a Nordic market design in other regions. We believe that in this thesis, we have 
been able to show that the Québec electricity market has a great starting point and is able to 
learn from the market restructuring in Norway 20 years ago. We believe a restructuring 
would improve the economic efficiency and benefit current and future generations of 
Québecers.  Our estimates vary between almost zero to around 200 Billion dependent on 
the outcome of fossil fuel prices, CO2 prices and which restructuring scenario that is chosen. 
Most likely a restructuring of the Québec electricity market would mean around a 100 billion 
dollar income for Hydro-Québec and its owner. It is up to the politicians to have the courage 
to make an unpopular political decision, whether or not Québec can benefit more from their 
valuable assets and increase the province’s income and welfare.  
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Rekordhøye strømpriser - denne uken dobles prisen: 
Ikke velg feil priskontrakt på strøm 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/artikkel.php?artid=593634 
- CO2-kvoter gir strøm-sjokk - Høyere strømpris rett i statskassen 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/artikkel.php?artid=173700 
U.S. Energy Information Administration EIA  
- Monthly U.S. Natural Gas Electric Power Price 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n3045us3m.htm 
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- Status of Electricity Restructuring by State 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.h
tml 
- Electric Power Annual 2008, 1990-2008 Net Generation by State by Type of 
Producer by Energy Source (EIA-906) 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sprdshts.html 
- Natural Gas overview 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/info_glance/natural_gas.html 
- Coal overview  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelcoal.html 
- Receipts, Average Cost and Quality of Fossil Fuels Table 4.13.A. and 4.10.A. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table4_1.html 
- ES 4 Fuel cost for electricity generation, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/figes4.html 
- Wholesale Market Data NEPOOL wholesale prices 2010,  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/wholesale/wholesale.html 
- Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program  
Fuel and Energy Source Codes and Emission Coefficients  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/coefficients.html  
 
 
